Frederick R. Homer v. Sandy Hills, Inc. : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Frederick R. Homer v. Sandy Hills, Inc. : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Harold C. Verhaaren; Mazuran, Verhaaren & Hayes; Michael W. Homer; H. Michale Drake; Suitter
Axland Armstrong & Hanson; Attorneys for Appellee.
Clark W. Sessions; Cynthia K.C. Meyer; Campbell Maack & Sessions; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Homer v. Sandy Hills, Inc., No. 920722 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3708
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FREDERICK R. HOMER, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SANDY HILLS, INC., 
Defendant/Appellant, 
APPELLANT'8 REPLY 
BRIEF 
ROBERT STEUR and DEBRA D. 
STEUR, and ROBERT STEUR, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
REED M. SMITH, BARBARA D. 
SMITH and SANDY HILLS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
Court of Appeals 
No. 920722-CA 
Priority 16 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
HAROLD C. VERHAAREN 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES 
2180 South 1300 East #260 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone (801) 484=6161 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellee Homer 
MICHAEL W. HOMER 
H. MICHAEL DRAKE 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & 
HANSON 
175 South West Temple #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellees Steurs 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. ^2-£lZ-2-
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER (5050) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
NOV 3 0 1992 
'""., 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FREDERICK R. HOMER, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SANDY HILLS, INC., 
Defendant/Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S REPLY 
BRIEF 
ROBERT STEUR and DEBRA D. 
STEUR, and ROBERT STEUR, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
REED M. SMITH, BARBARA D. 
SMITH and SANDY HILLS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Court of Appeals 
No. 920722-CA 
Priority 16 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
HAROLD C. VERHAAREN 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES 
2180 South 1300 East #260 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone (801) 484=6161 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellee Homer 
MICHAEL W. HOMER 
H. MICHAEL DRAKE 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & 
HANSON 
175 South West Temple #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellees Steurs 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER (5050) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. REPLY TO HOMERfS BRIEF 1 
A. HOMER DID NOT PROVE HIS RIGHT TO A PRESCRIPTIVE 
EASEMENT OVER SANDY HILLS' PROPERTY BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE 1 
B. SANDY HILLS MARSHALLED ALL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT 
HOMER HAD ACQUIRED PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS OVER 
SANDY HILLS' PROPERTY 10 
C. HOMER MUST ESTABLISH HIS RIGHT TO PRESCRIPTIVE 
EASEMENTS THROUGH HIS OR HIS PREDECESSOR'S USE 
OF THE PROPERTY 15 
D. SANDY HILLS ESTABLISHED THAT DEWEYS' USE OF 
SANDY HILLS' PROPERTY WAS PERMISSIVE THROUGH 
DIRECT TESTIMONY AND THROUGH PRESUMPTIONS OF 
PERMISSIVE USE 21 
1. The Smiths' testimony was credible and 
consistent 21 
2. Sandy Hills' Permission Evidence is not 
Barred by its Failure to Plead it as an 
Affirmative Defense 27 
3. Presumptions of Permissive Use Defeat 
Homer's Claims of Prescriptive Easement . . . 28 
a. Sandy Hills opened a way across its 
property which was used by Sandy 
Hills' neighbors without causing 
damage which raised a Presumption of 
Permission 28 
b. The Smiths' and Deweys' family 
relationship raises a presumption 
that the use of each others' property 
was permissive and not under a claim 
of right 30 
4. Joint Driveway Cases do not Apply to the 
Facts of this Case 32 
5. The Smiths' Transfer of their Property to 
a Family Corporation did not Revoke their 
Permission to the Deweys to Cross their 
Property 34 
6. Homer Could not Tack to the Deweys' Use . . . 35 
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING HOMER TO 
REMOVE THE ENCROACHMENT OF THE UPPER STORY OF 
THE HOMER BUILDING FROM SANDY HILLS' BUILDING . . . 37 
II. REPLY TO THE STEURS' BRIEF 39 
A. THE IMPROVEMENTS PLACED BY THE STEURS IN THE 
26-FOOT RIGHT-OF-WAY IMPERMISSIBLY REDUCED ITS 
WIDTH 39 
B. THE STEURS' IMPROVEMENTS MADE THE RIGHT-OF-WAY 
LESS INVITING TO SUPPLIERS 44 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PARTIES DID NOT CONTEMPLATE SEMI TRACTOR-
TRAILERS USING THE RIGHT-OF-WAY IN LIGHT OF THE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE DEED AND AGREEMENT 47 
49 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES EAGE 
Aladdin Petroleum Corp v. Gold Crown Properties. Inc.. 
221 Kan. 579, 561 P.2d 818 (1977) 45, 46 
Anderson v. Felten. 612 P.2d 216 (Nev. 1980) 15 
Andrzeiczvk v. ADVO System. Inc.. 151 A.2d 881 
(Conn. 1959) 17 
Barnes v. Wood. 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) 41 
Buckley v. Cox. 122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 277 
(1949) 28 
Bullouah v. Sims. 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 
(1965) 41 
Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Cache County Poultry 
Growers Ass'n. 116 Utah 258, 209 P.2d 251 (1949) 28 
Camp Meeker Water System v. Public Utilities 
Comm'n. 799 P.2d 758 (Cal. 1990) 49 
Chournos v. Alkema. 27 Utah 2d 244, 
494 P.2d 950 (1972) 14, 18 
City of Anchorage v. Nesbett. 530 P.2d 1324 
(Alaska 1975) 33 
Citv of Ashland v. Hardestv. 543 P.2d 41 
(Or. Ct. App. 1975) 17 
Consolidated Amusement Co. v. Waikiki Business 
Plaza. Inc.. 719 P.2d 1119 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986) 44 
Cooper v. Boise Church of Christ. 96 Idaho 45, 
524 P.2d 173 (1974) 33 
Cope v. Cope. 493 P.2d 336 (Mont. 1972) 25, 30 
Crane v. Crane. 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984) 17 
Deregibus v. Silberman Furniture Co.. 186 A. 553 
(Conn. 1936), after retrial. 197 A. 760 (Conn. 1938) . . . . 18, 34 
Elder v. Northwest Timber Co.. 101 Idaho 356, 
613 P.2d 367 (1980) 27 
Ellison v. Fellows. 437 A.2d 278 (N.H. 1981) 17 
Feldman v. Knapp. 250 P.2d 92 (Or. 1952) 17 
Friend v. Holcombe. 162 P.2d 1008 (Okla. 1945) 31 
Garmond v. Kinney. 91 N.M. 646, 579 P.2d 178 
(1978) 15, 25 
Guinand v. Walton. 25 Utah 2d 253, 
480 P.2d 137 (1971) 20 
Jacobs v. Brewster. 190 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. 1935) 17, 31 
Jensen v. Gerrard. 85 Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070 (1935) 28 
Johnson v. Whelan. 171 Okla. 243, 42 P.2d 882 
(1935) 31 
Lunt v. Kitchens. 123 Utah 488, 260 P.2d 535 
(1953) 30, 31 
Luoma v. Donohoe. 588 P.2d 523 (Mont. 1979) 15 
Medina v. Brown. 342 P.2d 353 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959) 15 
Nielson v. Sandbera. 105 Utah 93, 
141 P.2d 696 (1943) 14 
Read v. Pokey. 92 Or. App. 298, 758 P.2d 399 
(Ct. App. 1988) 16, 31 
Richard v. Pines Ranch. Inc.. 559 P.2d 948 
(Utah 1977) 14 
Richins v. Struhs. 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314 
(1966) 27, 30-32, 34 
Rippentrop v. Pickering. 15 Utah 2d 59, 387 P.2d 94 (1963) . . . 30 
Savage v. Nielsen. 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117 
(1948) 28 
Sdrales v. Rondos. 116 Utah 288, 209 P.2d 562 (1949) 28 
Shumate v. Robinson. 52 Or. App. 199, 627 P.2d 1295 
(Ct. App. 1981) 27 
Simmons v. Perkins. 118 P.2d 740 (Idaho 1941) 15, 18 
Squaw Peak Community Covenant Church of Phoenix v. Anozira Development. 
Inc.. 719 P.2d 295 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) 43 
Super Tire Market. Inc. v. Rollins. 18 Utah 2d 122, 
417 P.2d 132 (1966) 41 
Swift v. Kniffen. 706 P.2d 296, 304 
(Alaska 1985) 15 
Te Selle v. Storev. 319 P.2d 218 (Mont. 1957) 17 
Thompson v. Scott. 270 Or. 542, 528 P.2d 509 
(1974) 16, 25 
Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Morgan Bros. Land 
and Livestock Co. . 81 Utah 317, 17 P.2d 826 (1932) 14, 16 
Trueblood v. Pierce. 179 P.2d 671 (1947) 32 
Zollinger v. Frank. 110 Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714 
(1946) 28 
RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(b) 26 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
2 Thompson on Real Property, § 345 (1961 Replacement) 32 
3 Powell on Real Property, J 413, (1973) 16 
3 Tiffany, Real Property S 805 (3d ed. 1939) 45 
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 45 (1966) 33 
28 C.J.S. Easements § 18 32 
28 C.J.S. Easements § 75 45 
ARGUMENT 
I, REPLY TO HOMER'S BRIEF 
A. HOMER DID NOT PROVE HI8 RIGHT TO A PRESCRIPTIVE 
EASEMENT OVER SANDY HILLS1 PROPERTY 
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE 
Homer assails Sandy Hills1 statement of facts, by claiming a 
failure to marshal all facts which support the trial courtfs findings,1 
then by purportedly setting forth the facts which "are material to and 
support those findings." Homer brief at 3. Homerfs listing of facts 
and record citations reveal the paucity of evidence Homer mustered to 
support his prescriptive easement claims. As will be demonstrated, 
using Homer's record citations, many of his fact statements are wildly 
inaccurate: 
1. Homer's fact statement 9 is absolutely false with the 
exception of the customers1 and Mr. Dewey's use of Sandy Hills' 
property. 
On direct examination by Mr. Verhaaren. Reed Smith testified: 
Q. . . . I said after that curb cut was installed [directly east of 
the Sandy Hills building], that was the point through which 
customers for your store would gain access from 2100 East. 
A. Yes. 
. . . 
Q. Customers for the Dewev building, did they also have or gain 
access, or did they gain access through that same point? 
A. Well, I think customers drove both ways, yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Drive in from the south and drive to the front. Drive from the 
north and they would drive—and they would exit one or the other. 
Q. And your customers, I assume, when they would park in front of 
your building when they exited, I assume, that at least some of 
them would drive out toward the south past the Homer building? 
Homer's failure to marshal the facts argument will be responded to below. 
A. Well, as I recall, the parking in front of the building was 
just straight. People would go straight in, and also parked in a 
herringbone along the front, the way it is. 
Q. So, after that [the installation of the curb and gutter], how 
did your customers exit from your building? 
A. They pulled in front of the building, back either way, and 
would drive out the driveway. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Out this way? 
No. Front driveway. 
This way? 
Yes. 
Exit and entrance? 
Yes. 
Q. After those buildings were built, the Dewey building and the 
Jones building. 
How have customers for those buildings gained access to the 
parking in front of those buildings? 
A. I think they came from both ways. They would come from the 
north— 
Q. Both ways being—excuse me. Go ahead. 
A. They would come from the north and they would come in from the 
south. 
Record at 936-42 (emphasis added)• 
Frederick Homer testified: 
Q. Okay. When you were employed by Bonneville [Drug, in 1964], 
were you there on the premises on a daily basis? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did you have an opportunity to see how customers of 
Bonneville Drug gained access to the parking area east of the Homer 
building? 
A. You bet. 
Q. How did they do that? 
A. They came in the curb cut and— 
Q. Why don't you step down here and make a mark on Exhibit 35-P, 
if you would, please. It's a little bit low. Can you see okay? 
This is the Sandy Hills building right here. 
Q. Have you got that marked now correctly? 
A. Yes. They would usually go out this way. 
Q. Now, Mr. Homer, maybe we should mark—why don't we have you 
mark the curb cuts where you start with that line, and mark that as 
A, Point A, describing what's below. 
A. Okay. 
Q. And then where you got the exit, use a point— or the other end 
of the line, Point B. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Mr. Homer, while you were there on the premises, did you have 
the opportunity to observe customers of other businesses and how 
they gained access and where they parked, both in the front and the 
rear of the building? 
A. You bet? 
Q. How was that done? 
A. Well, they had, because of—primarily because of the striping 
and the configuration, especially in the front, they came in that— 
or a curb cut, and came in and parked either in front of Sandy 
Hills, if they were Sandy Hills' customers, or in front of my drug 
store, if they were my customers. 
Record at 1233-1237 (emphasis added). 
Russell Grimshaw. the barber shop tenant of the northernmost 
subdivision of the Homer building, testified: 
Q. And would you indicate how customers would reach your property 
from 2100 East as far as gaining access is concerned [at] anytime 
from the time you first occupied the property? 
A. As I say, nothing has changed. And they come in front of 
Smith's property and go down and park in front of the businesses 
and then back and then down through the drive-through. 
Q. Where have you observed, then, your customers gaining access to 
the front parking area? 
A. They come in through entrance A. 
Q. And when they exit, where do they usually go? 
A. B. 
Record at 1337-38 (emphasis added). 
Barbara Smith testified: 
Q. Mrs. Smith, after the curb and gutter was installed along 21st 
East Street and there were curb cuts placed at various intervals, 
is it true that Mr. Dewey. from time to time, crossed in front of 
the Sandy Hills Building in order to gain access to his property? 
A. Oh, yes. That's true. 
Record at 1637a-38 (emphasis added). 
In the foregoing record citations there is no evidence of Homer's 
use of the Sandv Hills property nor of Dewey's or Homer's tenants1, 
agents', business invitees', employees' or vendors' use of the Sandy 
Hills property. 
2. Homer's fact statement 10 is irrelevant because the Smith's 
use of its property and of neighboring property was not an issue at 
trial and is not an issue on appeal. The fact statement, however, is 
lacking in its record support. 
Homer's record citations are devoid of evidence of anyone's use, 
except customers of Sandy Hills. Homer's citation to pages 937-41 of 
the record is Reed Smith's testimony, reproduced in all material 
respects as it relates to ingress and egress above, regarding fact 
statement 9. 
Russell Grimshaw testified: 
Q. Have you observed customers of Sandy Hills or its predecessors 
gain access to the premises? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have your customers parked down in front of Sandy Hills 
building? 
A. Yes, they have over the years• 
Q. And have Sandy Hills customers parked in front of your 
building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you watched the Sandy Hills customers gain access and — 
I111 say ingress and egress—get access to the parking in front of 
this building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, where that—where they gain access and at what point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when they exit, which way they go? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do they always do it that way? 
A. Not always, no. 
Q. When they don't do it that way, how do they do it? 
A. If they decide to go back the way they came in, they back out 
and go out. And they don't always just drive through, but that's 
the general flow of the traffic through there. 
Record at 1338-1339 (emphasis added). 
3. The first sentence of Homer's fact statement 11 is accurate, 
but the second sentence is inaccurate. 
Reed Smith testified that fill dirt was brought in on Lots 1, 2, 3 
and 4 to raise the level of the property to store level and to provide 
a parking lot and access from 1300 South. Record at 902-03. 
Barbara Smith testified that dirt was hauled in to make the parking 
lot in the rear. Record at 1643. 
Darrell Scheller, the former proprietor of the Jones Building 
depicted on Exhibit 87-D, testified that the rear of the properties was 
filled in and hard surfaced, and that after that, he and others gained 
access from 1300 South, across the back, and out the alley to 2100 
East. Record at 1323-24. 
4, Homer's fact statement 13 is completely false with the 
exception of access by customers of the various business and Scheller's 
basement tenant[s]. 
Reed Smith testified: 
Q. . . . The point I want to make was that after that time, 
customers for your store, customers for the Homer store, and 
customers for Callister fnow Steur] property, Sprouse Reitz. had 
access off 1300 South along the back over this 50-foot right-of-way 
and off 2100 East through the right-of-way, directly east of the 
Sprouse Reitz Building? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that continued that way for a number of years until this 
concrete barrier went in place; isn't that true? 
A. Now the question you asked me, there was freedom of traffic in 
and out across that—until that point in time? 
Q. Correct. 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Record at 947-48 (emphasis added). 
Frederick Homer testified; 
Q. . . . And would you indicate—and this time start with letter C, 
perhaps—where access was gained from 13th South to park to the 
rear of the Homer building, and then where the exits from that 
parking would be. 
A. All right. Starts here. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Is that all right? And go through here and usually come out 
here at B. 
Q. At Point B. 
A. Right. 
Q. How was access gained to the rear from 2100 East, then? 
A. Come in at Point B and go back here and park in here. And if 
there was—depending on where they were going, they would need to 
go out to Point C or turn around and come out Point B. 
Q. . . . Was that the pattern that was followed during the time 
that you were there at the premises starting in 1964? 
A. You bet. 
Record at 1334-35 (emphasis added). 
Darrell Scheller testified: 
Q. . . Describe how customers would gain access to and from the 
rear parking area to 13th South. 
A. Across the property from 13th South, across the Sandy Hills 
property, across the Homer property, and the tenants had a parking 
soot there for their unit in the basement, where thev could come 
from 21st East, either way. 
Record at 1326 (emphasis added). 
5. Homerfs fact statement 14 is equally devoid of evidentiary 
support and is irrelevant. Sandy Hills' and its predecessors1 use of 
the various properties was not an issue at trial and is not an issue on 
appeal• 
The record citations for fact statement 14 are the same as set 
forth above for fact statement 13. Again, the evidence shows use only 
by various customers of the businesses, Homer's vague "access was 
gained" reference and Scheller's reference to his basement tenant[s]. 
Furthermore, Reed Smith and Darrell Scheller testified that customers 
gained access from 1300 South and across the rear. Homer apparently 
showed on the exhibit how "access was gained" to the rear from 1300 
South and from 2100 East. 
6. Homer's fact statement 15 is accurate with the following 
exceptions: (1) The 1953 Agreement was signed only by Reed Smith, 
Thomas Dewey and Vera Callister (exhibit S-6); (2) The Agreement and 
deeds of right-of-way (exhibits S-10 and S-11) called for reciprocal 
easements between the Deweys and Smiths on the one hand and Mrs. 
Callister on the other. The Dewevs and Smiths did not grant each other 
reciprocal rights-of-way. 
7. Homer's fact statement 21 is accurate but incomplete. Reed 
Smith is the president and secretary of Smith Investment Company, 
record at 1633, and there are no non-family members who are officers, 
directors or shareholders of Smith Investment Company. Id. Barbara 
Smith is the "vice president". Record at 798-99. 
8. Regarding Homer's fact statement 22, while it is true that 
Reed Smith considered Steurs to be in violation of the 1953 Agreement, 
Homer's record citation does not support the assertion that Reed Smith 
sought support from Homer to terminate the agreement. Homer testified 
at pages 1243 and 1244 of the record that Mr. Smith said he was 
concerned about the impact of Mr. Steur's parking and inquired whether 
Homer considered Mr. Steur to be in breach of the parking areas in the 
back. Homer responded, "Well, I can't tell what is Mr. Steur's parking 
and what is customer parking. I don't stand out here and monitor it 
all the time."2 Homer said that Mr. Smith said, "Well, we've got to 
do something about this," and that when Homer responded that Steur had 
18 parking stalls on the rear parking areas, Mr. Smith became angry. 
Record at 1243-44. 
9. Homer's fact statement 23 is inaccurate, completely irrelevant 
to any issue below or on appeal and presents evidence as to which an 
objection was sustained. Record at 1244. 
10. While Homer's fact statement 24 is not completely inaccurate. 
Reed Smith testified, however, that his purpose in erecting the 
concrete and chain link fence was to prevent access from 2100 East 
through the rear 50-foot right-of-way to the two lots (Lichfield 
Gardens, Lots 1 and 2) north of the barrier. Record at 879. 
11. Homer's fact statement 26 is irrelevant to any issue on 
appeal. The trial court determined that "Homer is entitled to no 
2
 This also is probably a more honest answer to the question whether he observed 
how access was gained to the front and rear of his property. He probably did not 
"stand out here and monitor it all the time" any more than he monitored parking. 
damages by reason of any alleged trespass of Sandy Hills or its agents 
on the Homer Building." Record at 642, 661 (Conclusion of Law 14). 
12. Homer's fact statement 27 is unsupported by the evidence. 
Homer testified on cross-examination that Mr. Smith did not object to 
Homer's customers' and tenants' ingress and egress across the front and 
rear of the Sandy Hills property, nor did he grant permission to use 
that property. Record at 1309-10. There is no testimony identified 
that would support (explicitly or implicitly) that Homer's and his 
Predecessors' use of the front and rear of the Sandy Hills property was 
"visible to and known by the Smiths and their successors-in-interest, 
and continued uninterrupted." 
13. Homer's fact statement 28 is also unsupported by the evidence. 
At pages 1238 and 1239 of the record, Homer related a conversation 
he had with Reed Smith regarding patron parking. Mr. Homer said that 
nothing was discussed with regarding access to the properties. At page 
1242, Homer related another conversation with Reed Smith in which Reed 
Smith told Homer that Homer did not need cones to protect the new 
asphalt on the parking lot. Nothing was discussed regarding access to 
the property. At page 1295, Mr. Homer stated that he had no written 
agreement giving him access to cross the front or rear of the Sandy 
Hills property. As set forth above, at pages 1309-1310, Homer stated 
that Mr. Smith had neither objected to nor granted permission for 
Homer's customers or tenants to cross the front and rear of the Sandy 
Hills property. 
Finally, at pages 1689-92 of the record, on cross-examination Mr. 
Smith testified that although he permitted the Deweys and their patrons 
t o cross the proper ty , he did not permit Homer t o cross the p roper ty . 3 
Mr. Smith a l so t e s t i f i e d t h a t he deeded Dewey's property t o him 
r e l u c t a n t l y but t h a t he had a good r e l a t i onsh ip with Mr. Dewey. Record 
a t 1689-91. Mr. Verhaaren fs attempt to impeach Mr. Smith on t h a t point 
was s t r i cken by the t r i a l cour t . Id. a t 1696. 
B . SANDY HILLS MARSHALLED ALL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
THAT HOMER HAD ACQUIRED PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS 
OVER SANDY HILLS1 PROPERTY 
In 23 separa te ly numbered and single-spaced paragraphs spread over 
four pages of i t s main br ief in sect ion A. l , Sandy H i l l s marshalled not 
only evidence supporting the t r i a l cour t 1 s f indings and conclusions 
t h a t Homer had acquired a p re sc r ip t ive easement over Sandy H i l l s 1 
proper ty , but a l l evidence adduced by any par ty concerning the claimed 
p r e s c r i p t i v e easements. See pages 16-19 of Appellants1 main b r i e f . 
The following findings and conclusions of the t r i a l cour t cannot 
s tand: Findings of Fact 23 and 244 regarding Homer f s and h i s 
Predecessors1 and Sandy H i l l s 1 and t h e i r Predecessors ' use of the 
property ea s t of the Sandy Hi l l s bui ld ing; Findings of Fact 26 and 27 
regarding Homer's and h i s Predecessors1 use of the property ea s t of the 
Sandy H i l l s bui lding and the character of the use ; Findings of Fact 34, 
35, 36 and 37 regarding Homer's and h i s Predecessors ' and Sandy H i l l s ' 
and t h e i r Predecessors ' use of the property west of t h e i r r e spec t ive 
bui ld ings and the character of Homer's and h i s Predecessors ' use ; 
3
 This testimony was e l i c i t e d by reading Sandy H i l l s ' Interrogatory Answers. The 
s tructure of the answers c l e a r l y implied that i t was a f ter Mr. Homer (through 
Bonnevi l le Drug) bought the property that Sandy H i l l s did not extend permission t o 
Mr. Homer. See Defendants* Answer t o Interrogatory No. 3 , a copy of which i s 
reproduced as Exhibit A in the addendum. In addit ion, that port ion of the 
Interrogatory answer read by Mr. Smith, record at 1690, s ta ted that Mr. Smith did not 
g ive permission t o Homer or h i s l e s s e e s t o cross the property. Homer had l e s s e e s only 
a f t er he owned the property. F ina l ly , Mr. Smith t e s t i f i e d that the permission he gave 
t o Dewey t o cross the property was extended t o Mr. Dewey's l e s s e e s , including 
Bonnevi l le Drug, during the time i t was a l e s s e e of Mr. Dewey. Record at 1661. 
* Record at 642. 
Findings of Fact 39, 40 and 41 regarding Smiths' testimony that they 
granted permission to Deweys to use their property, the 
characterization of testimony as unworthy of belief, the rejection of 
that testimony, and the rejection that Smith Investment Company and 
Sandy Hills gave permission to Deweys or their successors; Finding of 
Fact 44 regarding Bonneville Drug's and Russell Grimshaw's expectations 
under their leases; Finding of Fact 46 concerning the use by Homer and 
his Predecessors of the property east and west of Sandy Hills' property 
and the nature of that use not in subordination to Sandy Hills. The 
Conclusions of Law which correspond to these Findings of Fact are also 
unsupported. See Record at 642. 
The fatal flaw in these Findings of Fact (and in the corresponding 
Conclusions of Law) is that the evidence does not support them. 
Consistently throughout the trial, evidence was adduced as to various 
customers' use of the parties' properties for ingress, egress and 
parking. Very little evidence was presented concerning any other 
person's use of Sandy Hills' property on the front (east) or rear 
(west) for ingress and egress to and from the various businesses. 
Importantly, even less evidence was presented concerning Homer's use of 
the property or the use of his privies (Deweys, Bonneville Drug, 
Grimshaw, Homer's agents, employees or suppliers). Other than 
customers of the various businesses, whose use of Sandy Hills' property 
for ingress and egress was necessarily permissive, being invitees of 
the businesses, and whose use would not inure to the benefit of Homer 
in any event because their use was not in privity with Homer, the 
following is all of the evidence adduced concerning any other person's 
use of Sandy Hills' property5: 
* This list is taken directly from the list of evidence marshalled by Sandy Hills 
in its main brief at pages 16-19. 
1. Reed Smith testified that before Sandy Hills placed a barrier 
along its boundary line in the front of its store in 1989, a person 
could gain access to the front of the Sandy Hills property from the 
curb cut on 2100 East and then drive to the south and exit through 
the other curb cut. Record at 949-50. 
2. Frederick Homer testified that access was gained from 1300 
South to park to the rear of the Homer building and usually the 
exit would be at Point B [the curb cut south of the Homer building 
and east of the Steur building at the opening of the 26-foot right-
of-way north of the Steur building]. Access to the rear from 2100 
East Street was gained at Point B. Depending on where they were 
going, they would need to go out at Point C [the 1300 South curb 
cut] or turn around and come out Point B. Record at 1235. 
3. Mr. Homer testified that he believed there was public access 
from Points B [across the Steur property] and C [across Sandy 
Hills1 property]. Record at 1276-77. 
4. Darrell Scheller [the former proprietor of the Jones building] 
testified that after the rear parking area was hard-surfaced, he 
and others gained access to the back of the property from 1300 
South [across Sandy Hills1 property] and then down the 26-foot 
right-of-way to 2100 East. Record at 1324. 
5. Darrell Scheller testified that "the tenants had a parking spot 
there for their unit in the basement, where they could come from 
2100 East, either way [indicating the Jones building location]. 
Record at 1326. 
6. Darrell Scheller testified that he had a verbal agreement with 
Mr. Dewey because of the elimination of his right-of-way. Mr. 
Dewey guaranteed him access to 1300 South [across Sandy Hills1 
property] and to 2100 East, and his customers used that for many 
years. Record at 1330. 
7. Darrell Scheller testified that they (being Mr. Smith and Mr. 
Dewey) granted Mr. Scheller a right-of-way across Lots 1, 2 [Sandy 
Hills1 property], 3 and 4 when they cut off his right-of-way to 
Yuma Street. Record at 1332. 
8. Mr. Scheller testified that when a thousand people or more 
would go through there [across the Sandy Hills property from 1300 
South], public access may be available to a lot of people. Record 
at 1333-34. 
9. Barbara Smith testified that after the curb and gutter were 
installed along 2100 East Street, Mr. Dewey crossed in front of the 
Sandy Hills building in order to gain access to his property. She 
testified that Mr. and Mrs. Smith permitted the Deweys to access 
the Smiths1 property and the Deweys permitted the Smiths to cross 
the Deweys1 property. Record at 1637a-39. 
10. Barbara Smith testified that in order for the Deweys or their 
customers or lessees to travel from the 26-foot right-of-way 
through Lots 3 and 4 to 1300 South Street they had to cross Lots 1 
and 2. Mrs. Smith testified that she did not object to the Dewevsf 
crossing Lots 1 and 2 because they were her parents. The Smiths 
and the Deweys did not enter into a written agreement with respect 
to crossing each others' property because she would have been 
embarrassed to ask for one. Mr. and Mrs. Smith consented to the 
Deweys' crossing Lots 1 and 2 in the rear and to the Dewevs' 
crossing in front of the Sandy Hills building. The Smiths also 
consented to the Dewevs' lessees and customers crossing Lots 1 and 
2 and in front of the Sandy Hills building. Record at 1648-53. 
11. Reed Smith testified that the Smiths permitted the Dewevs to 
cross their property and the Deweys permitted the Smiths to cross 
the Dewey property. Record at 1657. 
12. Reed Smith testified that the arrangement with the Deweys with 
respect to crossing each others' property extended to the Deweys on 
the one hand, the Smiths on the other, and their respective 
building lessees and the business patrons. This permission was 
extended from the Smiths to Bonneville Drug during the period of 
time that Bonneville Drug was a lessee of Mr. Dewey. Record at 
1660-61. 
There is simply no evidence in the foregoing of Homer's use of the 
property. The only evidence with respect to the use of his privies is 
the Deweys' use of the property and the testimony was that that use was 
permissive in nature. 
Not only is there grossly insufficient evidence of use of Sandy 
Hills' property by Homer and his privies, there is no evidence 
concerning the nature of that use (open, notorious, adverse) and little 
evidence as to the timing of that use (continuous and without 
interruption) . There is some evidence when various uses began, or when 
certain individuals first observed use, but that testimony of Mr. 
Smith, Mr. Homer, Mr. Grimshaw and Mr. Scheller was primarily of 
customers' use of the property.6 
Accordingly, the findings are against the clear weight of the 
evidence and are therefore clearly erroneous and must be overturned. 
In addition, Mr. Smith testified as to how "a person" could gain access; Mr. 
Homer testified how "access was gained" by unidentified persons; Mr. Scheller 
testified how "he and others" gained access. 
C. HOMER MUST ESTABLISH HIS RIGHT TO PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS 
THROUGH HIS OR HIS PREDECESSOR'S USE OF THE PROPERTY. 
Astoundingly, Homer criticizes the Utah Supreme Court's 
pronouncements that a person claiming a prescriptive easement must show 
that he acquired it by his own use independent of the use of others. 
Nielson v. Sandbercr. 105 Utah 93, 141 P.2d 696, 700 (1943). See also 
Richard v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977) (Maughan, J., 
dissenting) (evidence of use made by anyone other than plaintiff and 
his predecessors in interest is irrelevant; alleged use by others, not 
in plaintifffs chain of title, does not provide evidentiary basis to 
establish plaintiff's use under a claim of right) (quoting Nielson v. 
Sandbera, 105 Utah 93, 141 P.2d 696 (1943)). 
In Chournos v. Alkema. 27 Utah 2d 244, 494 P.2d 950 (1972), the 
Supreme Court upheld an easement by implication, but reversed the 
court's finding that a prescriptive easement had been established: 
The trial court erred in so far as it found a prescriptive 
right in defendants based upon public use. A prescriptive 
right was originally based upon the theory of a grant implied 
from long user, and it runs to the individual and not to the 
public. One cannot claim a right of way as a private one by 
showing that it has been used by the public; he must show user 
by himself or his predecessors of the way to his own lot. 
While a public road may be so established, the 
use by individual persons in common with the public 
generally is regarded as permissive, and by such 
common use no individual person can acquire a right 
by prescription as against the owner of the fee . . 
• 
494 P.2d at 953 (quoting Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Morgan Bros. 
Land and Livestock Co. , 81 Utah 317, 17 P.2d 826, 827 (1932) (emphasis 
added))• 
Homer's reliance on customers' use of the Sandy Hills property in 
order to establish a prescriptive easement in himself is the same as 
relying on public use. Customers of the various businesses are the 
general public and such use is considered to be permissive. 
Court after court has held that one claiming a prescriptive 
easement must establish his own use and cannot rely on a like right in 
others. See Swift v. Kniffen, 706 P.2d 296, 304 (Alaska 1985) 
(claimant's use must be notorious in its own right and not dependent on 
a similar right in others; if claimant's use is in common with the 
public's use, "the claimant must perform some act with the owner's 
knowledge clearly indicating his own individual claim of right."); 
Anderson v. Felten. 612 P.2d 216 (Nev. 1980) (no evidence that claimant 
ever used road after his purchase of the property; therefore, if an 
easement by prescription were created, it must have been by claimant's 
predecessor whose use was infrequent and sporadic. One may acquire a 
prescriptive easement which is also used by the public, but the private 
right must rest on actual use by the claimant and his predecessors and 
not on their use as members of general public); Luoma v. Donohoe, 588 
P.2d 523 (Mont. 1979) (an exclusive use means that the claimant's right 
to use the right-of-way is independent of a like right-of-way in 
another); Garmond v. Kinnev. 91 N.M. 646, 579 P.2d 178 (1978) (a 
finding that the general public used the roadway is inconsistent with 
the conclusion that plaintiffs established a prescriptive easement; an 
easement by prescription could not be acquired by usage common with or 
similar to that of the general public); Medina v. Brown, 342 P.2d 353 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (what is meant when exclusiveness is used in 
reference to an easement is that the right shall not depend for its 
enjoyment on a similar right in others; it must be exclusive as against 
the community and public at large); Simmons v. Perkinsr 118 P.2d 740 
(Idaho 1941) (the use of a driveway in common with the owner and the 
general public, in the absence of some decisive act on the user's part 
indicating a separate and exclusive use on this part, negatives any 
presumption of individual right therein in his favor; an individual 
using land as a road in common with the public cannot acquire a 
prescriptive right of way against the owner) (citing Thornley Land & 
Livestock Co. v. Morgan Bros. Land & Livestock Co., 81 Utah 317, 17 
P.2d 826 (1932)). 
In Read v. Pokey. 92 Or. App. 298, 758 P.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1988), 
the Court stated: 
Plaintiff has shown that he continuously used the road for 
more than [the prescriptive period]. However, the other facts 
preponderate against him. He did not construct the road but 
merely assisted in its maintenance. He used it as an existing 
way and, apparently, did not interfere with defendants1 use of 
their property until shortly before he brought his action. 
Also, his use has been non-exclusive in character. He 
introduced evidence that the road was used by others for a 
variety of purposes. The significance of that is discussed in 
Thompson v. Scott, supra, 270 Or. at 551, 528 P.2d 509, quoting 
3 Powell on Real Property, f 413, p. 483 (1973): 
"
fIf the claimant is only one of two, or 
several, or many, who make the use in question, it 
is perhaps inferrable [sic] that all of these uses 
are permissive. In such a case the claimant must 
affirmatively prove the adverse character of this 
behavior. Ilf 
758 P.2d at 400. 
Homer has not proved his use of Sandy Hills1 property, much less 
affirmatively proved the adverse character of it. Homer's testimony 
was vague and confusing as were the questions put to him. For example, 
he was asked how "access was gained" to the rear property without 
identification of by whom access was gained. The Court in Thompson v. 
Scott. 270 Or. 542, 528 P.2d 509 (1974), noted that the claimant's 
testimony of his use of the claimed easement was vague and ambiguous. 
This same kind of ambiguity pervades the entire record, leaving 
it unclear whether there was a use of any kind, adverse or 
otherwise, for a continuous period of ten years. We have 
frequently said that prescription or adverse possession cannot 
be established by vague and general testimony purporting to 
describe the claimants1 use. 
528 P.2d at 511. 
After attacking Sandy Hills1 contention that Homer can rely only on 
his use and that of his predecessors, Homer cites several cases for the 
proposition that one claiming a prescriptive easement may rely on the 
use of others "who are in privity with or in subordination to the 
claimant." Homer brief at 14. While Sandy Hills is not sure that that 
statement is different in kind from the general rule that one claiming 
a prescriptive right must show use by himself or his predecessors, an 
examination of Homerfs cases reveals that the use by "others" generally 
constituted use by the claimant. For example, in Crane v. Crane, 683 
P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984), the association members hired riders to herd 
sheep over the easement. The riders were therefore agents or employees 
of the association members and their use would be considered the 
claimants1 use. In Ellison v. Fellows. 437 A.2d 278 (N.H. 1981), the 
claimants and their agents used the roadway for various purposes. The 
Court stated that although the claimants did not always use the 
easement personally, use by their agents was sufficient to establish 
prescriptive rights in claimants. Again, the use of the agent of the 
claimants was considered the use of the claimant. 
Citv of Ashland v. Hardestv, 543 P.2d 41 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) , 
involved the City of Ashlandfs, claim that it had acquired a 
prescriptive easement by its employees1 use of the way as often as 
needed. Here, again, the employee's use was the claimant's use. A 
municipality cannot easily act without the human acts or attributes of 
its employees. Homer also cites many cases in which tenants1 use 
contributed to establishing the prescriptive easement. In Feldman v. 
Knapp. 250 P.2d 92 (Or. 1952), Te Selle v. Storey, 319 P.2d 218 (Mont. 
1957); Jacobs v. Brewster, 190 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. 1935); and Andrzeiczyk 
v. ADVO System. Inc., 151 A.2d 881 (Conn. 1959), there was evidence of 
ample adverse use by the owners of the dominant estate which was 
participated in by their tenants. Under the rule announced in 
Dereaibus v. Silberman Furniture Co., 186 A. 553 (Conn. 1936), after 
retrial
 f 197 A. 760 (Conn. 1938), use of the servient estate by a 
tenant can inure to the benefit of the landlord only if the use of the 
servient estate is expressed or implied under the lease. 
Despite Homer's contention that he can rely on the use of others to 
establish a prescriptive right in himself to cross Sandy Hills1 
property, the rule in Utah and most other jurisdictions remains that 
the person claiming the prescriptive right must show that he acquired 
it by his own use, or that of his predecessors-in-interest, independent 
of a similar right in others. In addition, Homerfs evidence showing 
use of Sandy Hills1 property by the general public indicates that all 
use of Sandy Hills1 property was permissive. While Homer can establish 
a prescriptive right to use property that is also used by the public, 
he must show some decisive act on his part indicating a separate and 
exclusive use. Chournos v. Alkema, 27 Utah 2d 244, 494 P.2d 950 
(1972); Simmons v. Perkins. 118 P.2d 740 (Idaho 1941). 
Homer presents a summary in his brief attempting to show use of 
Sandy Hills1 property by "Homer and his Predecessors, individually." 
Homer brief at 16-18. Homer testified, for example, that he was at the 
Homer property daily from 1964 to 1985. Id. at 16. Nothing is said 
concerning Homerfs access to the property, however, which is the 
critical issue. Homer has access to his property from the curb cut 
located at the 26-foot right-of-way off 2100 East. He does not have to 
cross Sandy Hills1 property to park in the front or the rear of his 
property from that access. Record at 1235, 1291-92. 
In addition, Homer recites to testimony concerning his tenants1 
parking in the rear of his building, Mr. Deweyfs parking in the rear of 
the property, and Russell Grimshawfs parking at the rear property. 
Record at 1304, 1239, 1346, 1350. Again, no mention was made of how 
these people gained access to the rear for parking. 
Homer makes the point that access to the Homer rear parking from 
1300 South can only be gained by crossing the Sandy Hills property. 
That is true, but it is also true that access to Homerfs rear parking 
can be gained from 2100 East without crossing Sandy Hills1 property. 
Simply because access can be gained across Sandy Hills1 property, it 
does not follow that Homer proved by clear and convincing evidence that 
he or his predecessors in interest crossed Sandy Hills1 property 
openly, notoriously, continuously and adversely for the prescriptive 
period. 
While Barbara Smith testified that the Deweys and their lessees, 
customers and tenants crossed Sandy Hills' property in the front and 
the rear to gain access to Homer's property, she also testified that 
that use was permissive. In any event, she did not testify how long 
such use continued. The same is true of Mr. Smith's testimony that the 
Deweys crossed Sandy Hills' property to gain access to their property. 
Homer also makes the following statement: 
Homer testified that he and his tenants used the Sandy Hills 
property for ingress and egress and that the Smiths and Sandy 
Hills did not object to that use. 
Homer brief at 16-17. The record citation for that statement is 
apparently pages 1309-10 (see footnote 11 on page 17 of Homer's brief). 
The statement is false regarding use. On cross-examination at pages 
1309-10 of the record Homer testified that neither the Smiths nor Sandy 
Hills objected to Homers' or Homers' tenants' use of "this means of 
ingress and egress," but no testimony was elicited as to whether Homer 
and his tenants used "this means" of ingress and egress. See Record at 
1309-10. 
D. SANDY HILLS ESTABLISHED THAT DEWEYS1 USE 
OF SANDY HILLS* PROPERTY WAS PERMISSIVE THROUGH 
DIRECT TESTIMONY AND THROUGH PRESUMPTIONS OF PERMISSIVE USE 
1. The Smiths1 testimony was credible and consistent. 
The Smiths testified that they extended permission to the Deweysf 
Barbara Smiths parents, to traverse the Smith property, and that the 
Deweys likewise extended permission to them to cross the Deweys1 
property. Record at 1639, 1650, 1652, 1657-58, 1661. Homerfs 
assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Smiths1 testimony is 
consistent and thoroughly credible. Admittedly, the testimony is self-
serving in the sense that it is favorable to the Smiths1 position, but 
that does not make it necessarily unbelievable. In Guinand v. Walton, 
25 Utah 2d 253, 480 P.2d 137 (1971), a case relied by Homer, the Court 
acknowledged that a witness1 self interest may justify not believing 
his testimony, "[b]ut it does not necessarily require doing so." 480 
P.2d at 139. In that case, the Court affirmed findings "based solely 
on the self-serving testimony of the plaintiff," despite the existence 
of other evidence. Id. 
Both Reed and Barbara Smith affirmed that they did not have a 
written agreement with the Deweys concerning crossing each others1 
property because the Deweys were Mrs. Smiths1 parents. Mrs. Smith 
testified: 
Q. All Right. Is there a reason that you and Mr. Smith and the 
Deweys did not enter into a written agreement of some kind with 
respect to crossing each others1 property in the rear? 
A. Well, I would have been embarrassed to ask them. I wouldn't 
have asked them to sign something on that. 
Record at 1650. 
Mr. Smith testified: 
Q. Now, Mr. Smith, did there come a point in time when the Smiths, 
on the one hand, and the Deweys, on the other hand, made any kind 
of a written contract, or agreement, that is in writing as to their 
customers being able to cross in front of their property—I'm 
sorry—your property to get to their destination, and vice versa? 
A. No, there was not a written agreement. 
Q. Can you tell the court why? 
A. Well, we didnft feel the need for a written agreement. Mr. and 
Mrs. Dewey were by wifefs parents, my in-laws. We permitted the 
Deweys to cross our property and they permitted us to cross theirs. 
Record at 1657. 
By contrast, the Smiths did have a written agreement with Mrs. 
Callister regarding easements. Exhibits S-6, S-10, S-ll. The Smiths 
and Deweys on the one hand granted Mrs. Callister the right to cross 
Lichfield Gardens Lots 1 and 2 (belonging to the Smiths) and Lots 3 and 
4 (belonging to the Deweys). In exchange, Mrs. Callister allowed the 
Smiths and Deweys to cross the northerly 26 and 1/2 feet of her 
property. Id. Significantly, the Deweys and Smiths did not have a 
written agreement between themselves concerning the Smiths1 crossing 
Lots 3 and 4 and the Deweys' crossing Lots 1 and 2, although it was 
obviously contemplated at least that the Smiths would cross Lots 3 and 
4 to access the 26-foot right-of-way over Mrs. Canister's property. 
Given the detail of the 1953 Agreement and the deeds of right-of-
way, the lack of an agreement between the Smiths and the Deweys was not 
an oversight. The logical conclusion is that they did not need an 
agreement between them since they permitted each to cross the others' 
property. It is not logical that the Smiths and Deweys intended to 
prescribe in the others' property—if they intended a permanent right-
of-way across each others' property, they easily could have included 
such a provision in the 1953 Agreement and have prepared deeds of 
right-of-way between them. 
Homer hyper-technically scrutinizes the Smiths' testimony in an 
attempt to discover internal discrepancies or weaknesses. For example, 
he points out that Mrs. Smith stated there was no arrangement between 
the Smiths and Deweys regarding crossing each others' property while 
Mr. Smith said there was an arrangement. Putting the testimony of the 
Smiths back into context, here is what they said: 
Mrs. Smith; 
Q. Mrs. Smith, do you recall whether you and Mr. Smith and Mr. and 
Mrs. Dewey had some kind of arrangement as to access by Mr. Dewey 
to the Dewey property? 
A. Yes, they used it freely. No, we didn't have any kind of an 
arrangements of any kind. They just used it as we did, too. 
Q. Did you and Mr. Smith permit the Deweys to have access through 
property, across your property? 
A. Yes. 
Record at 1638-39. 
Mr. Smith; 
Q. Can you tell the court why [there was not a written agreement 
between the Smiths and the Deweys regarding crossing each others1 
property]? 
A. Well, we didn't feel the need for a written agreement. Mr. and 
Mrs. Dewey were by wife's parents, my in-laws. We permitted the 
Deweys to cross our property and they permitted us to cross theirs. 
Q. Over what period of time did that—I'm going to call it an 
arrangement. Mr. Smith, where you were permitted to cross the 
Deweys' property and they were permitted to cross yours. How long 
did this arrangement last, sir? 
A. Oh, from the time that the west side parking was developed, 
approximately 1954 until the time that Mrs. Dewey passed away—or 
Mrs. Dewey sold her property, I should say. 
Record at 1657-58 (emphasis added). 
When considered in context the Smiths' testimony is consistent. 
Counsel coined the term "arrangement" in questioning Mr. Smith, but 
both witnesses testified that they did extend permission to the Deweys 
to cross their property. 
Homer also claims that the Smiths testified inconsistently on 
whether the Smiths1 and Deweys1 rear parking areas were common. Again, 
however, when the testimony is viewed in context, as it should be, the 
testimony is completely consistent. 
Mrs. Smith: 
Q. Now, once the parking areas were complete on Lots one, two, 
three and four, did you consider the parking area to be a common 
parking area? 
A. Yes. we considered it to be used by both of us. We used it; 
they used it. 
Q. I guess what I'm asking, Mrs. Smith, is whether once the 
parking area was developed, did you consider the parking area to be 
in common ownership with the Deweys? 
A. No. Oh, no, not common ownership, no. We were very independent 
and they were independent; and as far as taxes or anything else, we 
didn't ever know that they paid. They didnft know what we paid. 
They didn't know what we rented our duplexes for. So— 
Record at 1644-45. 
Mr. Smith: 
Q. Mr. Smith, was there ever an arrangement that you can tell us 
about that you were a party to with respect to the joint sharing of 
any parking? 
A. No, there was not. 
Q. So the arrangement, as you have described, was limited to 
simply crossing the property without any parking; is that right? 
A. That is correct? 
Record at 1660. 
This testimony also is consistent. Mrs. Smith testified that the 
parking areas were not in common ownership and Mr. Smith testified that 
there was not an arrangement for joint sharing of parking. Any 
arrangement the parties had was with respect crossing the properties. 
Finally, Homer claims that Mr. Smith changed his story by saying on 
direct examination that he did extend permission to Homer to cross the 
property and on cross examination admitted that he did not. A more 
careful examination of the testimony reveals that the Smiths extended 
permission to Homer to use the property while Homer was a tenant of the 
Dewevs and that the permission lasted until Mrs. Dewey sold her 
property: 
Q. Now, let me ask you, Mr. Smith, whether or not the arrangement 
to cross the respective parties1 properties between the Deweys, on 
the one hand, and the Smiths, on the other, extended to tenants of 
yours and Mrs. Deweys1? 
A. Yes. It was extended to the lessees of both of our properties. 
Q. And was the permission that you talked about, likewise, 
extended to Mr. Homerfs company—I believe the name was Bonneville 
Drug—while they were in the property? 
A. It was during the period of time that Mr. Homer was a lessee of 
Mr. Dewey. 
Record at 1660-61. 
Sandy Hills1 answer to interrogatory no. 3, in summarizing the 
substance of the facts and opinions about which Mr. Smith was expected 
to testify, stated as follows: 
6. That after 21st East Street was improved with curb, gutter and 
sidewalk, Mr. Smith permitted Mr. Dewey and his patrons to traverse 
Mr. Smith1s property located adjacent to the Dewey property; 
7. That in 1963, or thereabouts, Mr. Dewey began leasing the 
drugstore building to Plaintiff Homer, and that in or about 1976, 
Plaintiff Homer purchased the drugstore building including the 
barbershop, pizza parlor and apartments, from Lorraine Dewey, Mr. 
Dewey's widow; 
8. That neither Mr. Smith nor his successor(s) in interest, gave 
permission to Plaintiff Homer or his patrons, lessees or others 
claiming by, through or under him, to traverse the property owned 
by Mr. Smith or his successor(s) in the front or in the rear of the 
Sandy Hills building. 
At the end of the summary appeared the following admonition: 
The foregoing is not intended to be detailed nor exhaustive, 
but is only a summary of and the substance of Mr. Smith's 
expected testimony. 
A copy of Sandy H i l l s 1 answers to in terrogator i e s are included in the 
addendum here to . 
The substance of the foregoing summary of Mr. Smith fs expected 
testimony and i t s juxtapos i t ion revea l s that what was intended 
(although admittedly not c l e a r l y s t a t e d ) , was t h a t a f t e r Homer 
purchased the Dewey property, no permission was extended t o him. The 
permission extended by the Smiths went t o the Deweys and those who 
claimed under him. When Mr. Smith was asked a t t r i a l whether 
permission was extended by him t o Bonnevi l le Drug t o cros s the 
property, he answered: "It was during the period of time t h a t Mr. Homer 
was a l e s s e e of Mr. Dewey." Record at 1661. Mr. Smith a l s o expressed 
some confusion at t r i a l when asked whether h i s interrogatory answer 
(paragraph 8, above) would s t i l l be h i s testimony today. He answered, 
"Well, as I understand i t , y e s . " Id. at 1690. 7 
' Homer a l s o protested that the Smiths' testimony was hearsay and was e l i c i t e d 
through leading ques t ions . Homer brief at 24. The quest ions posed t o the Smiths 
concerning whether the Smiths and Deweys granted each other permission t o cross t h e i r 
property did not c a l l for hearsay. The witnesses were never asked t o r e l a t e a 
conversat ion, but were asked whether permission was extended by the Smiths t o the 
Deweys and v i c e versa . In addit ion, questions posed t o the wi tnesses did not suggest 
an answer. The quest ions posed, for example were: "Did you and Mr. Smith permit the 
Deweys t o have access through property, across your property?" Record at 1639. That 
quest ion c a l l s for a yes or no answer. F ina l ly , although counsel objected t o Mr. 
Ses s ions ' asking Reed Smith leading questions during Mr. Sess ions ' cross examination 
of him (Homer and the Steurs ca l l ed Reed Smith as t h e i r f i r s t w i t n e s s ) , on d i rec t 
examination of Mr. Smith, he was asked at length about the Smiths' arrangement with 
the Deweys concerning cross ing each others ' property without hearsay and leading 
quest ion objec t ions by counsel . See record at 1657-1662. 
As a p r a c t i c a l matter, in prescr ipt ive easement c a s e s , evidence of 
permission t o use the serv ient e s t a t e often c a l l s for hearsay. Indeed, some evidence 
that permission was not granted c a l l s for hearsay. Since evidence of permissive use 
rebuts any presumption of adverse use, the evidence must be allowed. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
Mr. and Mrs. Smith were ava i lab le for cross-examination concerning t h e i r a s s e r t i o n s 
that they granted permission t o the Deweys t o use t h e i r property. Mrs. Smith was not 
cross-examined. Mr. Smith was cross-examined only concerning whether he extended 
permission t o Homer and concerning h i s interrogatory answer, out l ined above. Record 
at 1687-90. In case a f ter case , permission evidence i s e l i c i t e d through hearsay. 
E . g . , Cope v . Cope, 493 P.2d 336 (Mont. 1972); Garmond v. Kinnev, 91 N.M. 646, 579 
P.2d 178 (1978); Thompson v. Scot t . 528 P.2d 509 (Or. 1974). 
2. Sandy Hills9 Permission Evidence is not Barred 
by its Failure to Plead it as an Affirmative Defense. 
Homer complains that since Sandy Hills did not plead permission as 
an affirmative defense, any evidence of permission was improperly 
received. Homer did not move to strike testimony regarding permission 
and only objected to it on Reed Smith's cross-examination (record at 
991), but did not object to it on Mr. Smith's direct examination, 
record at 1655-69, and did not object to it on the grounds that it was 
not pled as an affirmative defense on Barbara Smith's direct examina-
tion. Record at 1631-55. Moreover, Homer chose not to cross-examine 
Barbara Smith. Homer did cross-examine Reed Smith on the issue of 
permission. Record at 1689-90. Interrogatories that were submitted to 
Sandy Hills by Homer included inquiries as to the expected testimony of 
witnesses. Sandy Hills answered, indicating that Reed Smith would 
testify that the Deweys had permission to cross Sandy Hills' property. 
See addendum hereto (under local rule, interrogatories and answers are 
not filed with the court, but are retained by the parties). 
Importantly, Sandy Hills denied in its answer that Homer had 
obtained a prescriptive easement to cross Sandy Hills' property in the 
front or in the rear, record at 84-104, and affirmatively defended 
Homer's claims on the basis that Homer's complaint failed to state a 
claim on which relief could be granted. Sandy Hills' permission 
defense certainly can fall under the denials in the answer and the 
failure-to-state-a-claim affirmative defense. 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows liberal 
amendment of pleadings to conform to the evidence: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise 
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even a f t e r judgment; but f a i lu re so to amend does not a f fec t 
the r e s u l t of the t r i a l of these i s sues . If evidence i s 
objected t o a t the t r i a l on the ground t h a t i t i s not wi thin 
the i ssues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings t o be amended when the presenta t ion of the mer i t s of 
the ac t ion w i l l be subserved thereby and the object ing par ty 
f a i l s t o s a t i s fy the court t ha t the admission of such evidence 
would prejudice him in maintaining h i s act ion or defense upon 
the mer i t s . The court sha l l grant a continuance, i f necessary, 
t o enable the objecting par ty t o meet such evidence. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) (emphasis added). 
F ina l ly , Homer did not appeal any issues t o t h i s cour t . Fa i lu re to 
do so c o n s t i t u t e s a waiver of h i s r i gh t t o claim t h a t the court erred 
in the allowing of ce r t a in evidence. 
3. Presumptions of Permissive Use Defeat Homer's 
Claims of Prescriptive Easement.8 
a. Sandv H i l l s opened a way across i t s property which was used 
by Sandy H i l l s 1 neighbors without causing damage which r a i sed 
a Presumption of Permission. 
Homer makes the incredib le argument t h a t Sandy H i l l s did not open 
ways across i t s property because Sal t Lake City designated the locat ion 
of the curb cut in the front and because the ways extended across 
Homers proper ty . The fact t h a t Sal t Lake City announced where the 
curb cut would be located i s immaterial. The Smiths opened the way 
across t h e i r proper ty . The curb cut simply accommodated physical entry 
from the s t r e e t t o the property. The fact t h a t they ways extended 
across Homerfs property i s a lso immaterial. Ways often extend across 
severa l p r o p e r t i e s . In Sdrales v. Rondos, 116 Utah 288, 209 P.2d 562 
Homer argues that even i f the fac t s of the case do g ive r i s e t o presumptions 
of permissive use of the claimed easements, weightier po l i cy cons iderat ions d i c t a t e 
that the presumption of adverse use which a r i s e s when one has used another's property 
openly, notor ious ly and continuously for the prescr ipt ive period w i l l govern. (Sandy 
H i l l s , as s e t forth above, vigorously disputes that Homer e s t a b l i s h e d h i s or h i s 
predecessors ' use of Sandy H i l l s ' property openly, notoriously and continuously for 
20 y e a r s . ) Notwithstanding, many courts have held that p r e s c r i p t i v e easements are 
not favored in the law. Shumate v. Robinson, 52 Or. App. 199, 627 P.2d 1295, 1297 
(Ct. App. 1981); Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., 101 Idaho 356, 613 P.2d 367, 369 
(1980) . Indeed, in Homer's case , Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314 
(1966) , the Court s ta ted that the presumption of adverse use i s not absolute and does 
not preclude an owner from proving that the use was permissive. Thus, i t appears that 
"weightier" p o l i c y considerat ions would favor a permissive presumption over an adverse 
one. 
(1949), for example, the alley over which defendants claimed a 
prescriptive easement extended across the full widths of plaintiffs' 
and defendants1 property. 209 P.2d at 563 (description of alleyway and 
accompanying sketch). 
The critical element is that if a property owner opens a way for 
access to his property that is also used by others without causing 
damage, the use is presumed to be permissive. Buckley v. Cox. 122 Utah 
151, 247 P.2d 277 (1949); Sdrales v. Rondos. 116 Utah 288, 209 P.2d 562 
(1949) ; Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Cache County Poultry Growers Ass'n. 
116 Utah 258, 209 P.2d 251 (1949); Zollinger v. Frank. 110 Utah 514, 
175 P.2d 714 (1946). The Court in Buckley stated: 
A presumption well established in this state is that where 
a person opens a way for the use of his own premises, and 
another person also uses it without causing damage, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, such use by the latter is 
permissive, and not under a claim of right. . . . It was 
defendants burden to overcome this presumption and to 
establish his claim by clear and convincing evidence. 
247 P.2d at 279-80 (citing Jensen v. Gerrard. 85 Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070 
(1935); Savage v. Nielsen. 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117 (1948); Sdrales v. 
Rondos. 116 Utah 288, 209 P.2d 562 (1949); and Cache Valley Banking Co. 
v. Cache County Poultry Growers Ass'n. 116 Utah 258, 209 P.2d 251 
(1949)). 
Homer's contention at page 30 of his brief that Homerfs and his 
Predecessors1 use of Sandy Hills1 property "did impose a significant 
burden on the property and interfered with its unrestricted use by 
Sandy Hills and its Predecessors," is unsupported by evidence, and 
indeed, Homer offers no record support for the contention. The test is 
not whether use interferes with unrestricted access, but whether use 
caused damage. There is no evidence that Homerfs use (if any) caused 
damage• 
b. The Smiths' and Dewevs' family relationship raises a 
presumption that the use of each others1 property was 
permissive and not under a claim of right. 
Homer focuses on the year 1947 and the circumstances surrounding 
the Deweys' purchase of their property in an effort to show that the 
Smiths1 and the Deweys1 relationship over the next 30 years was 
hostile, Mr. Smith testified that he and his wife reluctantly sold 
adjacent property to the Deweys lffbecause we wanted to develop it at a 
later date.111 Record at 1694 (quoting Reed Smith's deposition). Mr. 
Smith agreed that the Smiths sold the property to the Deweys to keep 
the family peace. "'This endeavor in Salt Lake was purely our own 
until that point in time when [sic] we intended to keep it that way 
without family entanglements, and we were disappointed in the fact that 
[the Deweys] did move from Odgen to Salt Lake at about this time.'1' 
Record at 1695 (quoting Reed Smith's deposition). 
Of course, if the Smiths were not interested in maintaining a close 
and cordial family relationship with the Deweys, they could have ousted 
Mr. Dewey from the property after the weekend he began excavating the 
property prior to its sale to him. See record at 1694 (Mr. Dewey began 
excavating one weekend while the Smiths were away). Instead, to 
maintain family peace, the Smiths sold the property to the Deweys. 
Despite Homer's assertions to the contrary, there is evidence that the 
Smith and Dewey relationship was close and cordial over the next thirty 
years prior to Mrs. Dewey's death in 1976 (Mr. Dewey preceded her in 
death). 
For example, the Smiths paid Mr. Dewey to help in the construction 
of the Sandy Hills building. Record at 1636, 1693. The Smiths and 
Deweys permitted each other to cross their respective properties. 
Record at 1637a-39, 1648-53, 1657, 1660-61. The Smiths paid Mr. Dewey 
to work on their duplex fronting on Yuma Street. Record at 1644. Mr. 
Smith, later joined by Mr. Dewey, petitioned Salt Lake City for 
permission to construct a parking lot on the east portions of Lots 1 
and 2 of Lichfield Gardens owned by the Smiths and on Lots 3 and 4, 
owned by the Deweys. Mr. Smith and Mr. Dewey presented an agreement to 
the Lichfield Gardens lot owners to modify the restrictive covenants to 
allow a parking lot. Record at 907-910. Mr. Smith, Mr. Dewey and Mrs. 
Callister all agreed that the rear parking was for patrons only. 
Record at 1069. Mr. Dewey and Mr. Smith expressed concern over parking 
in the alley (26-foot right-of-way) that occurred after Sprouse-Reitz 
tenancy of Mrs. Canister's (now Steurs1) property. Record at 1074. 
Importantly, there is no evidence that after the Smiths sold 
property to the Deweys, their relationship was other than close and 
cordial. Contrary to Homerfs argument, Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 
356, 412 P.2d 314 (1966), certainly did not overrule Rippentrop v. 
Pickering, 15 Utah 2d 59, 387 P.2d 94 (1963), or Lunt v. Kitchens, 123 
Utah 488, 260 P.2d 535 (1953). In fact, the Richins Court cited to 
Lunt as authority. 412 P.2d at 316 n.8. 
Courts in other jurisdictions also recognize that a familial 
relationship will normally indicate permissive use of family member's 
property. In Cope v. Cope, 493 P.2d 336 (Mont. 1972), the Montana 
Supreme Court noted that 
it is a general principle of law that members of a family may 
not acquire an easement by prescription against each other in 
the absence of a showing of a clear, positive, and continued 
disclaimer and disavowal of title. 
Id. at 338 (emphasis added). The Court reversed the trial court's 
finding of a prescriptive easement based on the family relationship of 
the users and on testimony that use was by permission. 
The same circumstances were presented at trial below. First, the 
Smiths testified that the Deweys used their property with permission, 
and second, because of their family relationship, it can be presumed 
that the use was permissive.9 
4. Joint Driveway Cases do not Apply to the Facts of this Case. 
Homer obdurately insists that joint (or boundary-line) driveway 
cases govern the facts and circumstances of this case. Homer goes so 
far as to claim that 
the policy considerations in Richins fv. Struhs. 17 Utah 2d 
356, 412 P.2d 314 (1966)] refutes the disingenuous claim made 
by Sandy Hills that the dispositive fact which distinguishes 
Richins from Lunt Tv. Kitchens, 123 Utah 488, 260 P.2d 535 
(1953)] and this case is whether the adjoining properties are 
"vertically bisected" or "horizontally transacted [sic]" by the 
claimed easement. Those geometrical distinctions are wholly 
immaterial and irrelevant. 
Homer brief at 34. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Friend v. Holcombe, 162 P.2d 1008 
(Okla. 1945), cited as authority Johnson v. Whelan. 171 Okla. 243, 42 
P.2d 882 (1935), a case relied on by Homer. The Friend Court stated: 
The [mutual use] rule is narrow in its application. It 
applies when two owners of adjacent property construct a 
driveway, one-half of which is on the land of each and holds 
that the continuing use of such a driveway is in effect adverse 
and should be so treated. That when such use has continued for 
the statutory period of 15 years each of the parties has an 
easement on the land of the other for the continuing use of the 
driveway. The rule has no application in this case. 
Defendant in error, plaintiff below, has failed to call 
our attention to any case where the mutual use rule or mutual 
use exception has been applied to a roadway which consecutively 
crosses the land of different owners and our own research fails 
to reveal such a case. 
162 P.2d at 1011 (emphasis added). 
Indeed, Homer ignores the language of his own authority. In Jacobs 
v. Brewster, 190 S.W. 2d 894 (Mo. 1945), the Court explained that "one 
who joins his adjacent landowner in the construction of a paved private 
Q 
As set forth in point I.B., evidence presented by Homer established public use 
of Sandy Hills' property. Record at 1279-80, 1333-34. Public use of a way is pre-
sumed to be permissive. Read v. Pokey. 92 Or. App. 298, 758 P.2d 399, 400 (Ct. App. 
1988). 
way over and along the medial line has given such adjacent owner more 
than a mere license." Id. at 900. The Utah Supreme Court in Richins 
v. Struhs recognized the significance of the construction of the 
driveway and bridge along the common boundary between the properties: 
[The former owners1] respective families collaborated in 
constructing this driveway and bridge between the two 
properties on what was assumed to be the boundary: that it was 
for their joint use; that it was so used and maintained so long 
as they owned the property. 
. . . On the contrary when it is considered in the light 
of the principles of law and equity herein discussed, it is our 
opinion that the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the 
facts here shown, where the parties (predecessors) jointly 
established and used a driveway on what they thought their 
common boundary [footnote 10], is that the use meets the 
requirement of being open, notorious, continuous and adverse 
for more than 20 years and therefore has established a 
prescriptive right to continue to so use it. 
412 P.2d at 316-17 (emphasis added). In its footnote 10, the Court 
stated: 
That the use of a driveway on common boundary, partly on 
land of each for prescriptive period results in easement see 
Thompson on Real Property, Vol.2, § 345 (1961 Replacement)[.] 
Id. at n.10. 
Other real property authorities recognize the joint driveway or 
"mutual use11 rule. The Colorado Supreme Court in Trueblood v. Pierce. 
179 P.2d 671 (1947), quoted 28 CJ.S. Easements § 18: 
"Where adjoining proprietors lay out a way or alley between 
their lands, each devoting a part of his own land to that 
purpose, and the way or alley is used for the prescriptive 
period by the respective owners or their successors in title, 
neither can obstruct or close the part which is on his own 
land; and in these circumstances the mutual use of the whole of 
the way or alley will be considered adverse to a separate and 
exclusive use by either party." 
179 P.2d at 678. 
Put another way: 
In the case of a private way or alley lving over and along 
the boundary between lots or tracts of land that has been used 
without interruption by adjoining owners for the full 
prescriptive period for a common purpose, the user of each 
owner is generally regarded as adverse to the other so as to 
establish an easement by prescription in either owner against 
the other. 
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 45 (1966). 
In this case, there exists no driveway, alley or way along the 
boundary lines between the Sandy Hills and Homer properties. Indeed, 
there is no evidence that Mr. Smith and Mr. Dewey jointly constructed 
any kind of a way. The evidence is that Mr. Smith and Mr. Dewey 
separately constructed their commercial buildings and the parking areas 
to the east (front). Record at 923-24. Although Mr. Smith and Mr. 
Dewey collaborated in gaining permission to construct the rear parking 
area (once Mr. Smith had begun the process), record at 907-10, the 
parties developed Lots 1 and 2 (Smiths) and Lots 3 and 4 (Deweys) 
separately. Record at 1656. 
5. The Smiths1 Transfer of their Property 
to a Family Corporation did not Revoke their Permission 
to the Deweys to Cross their Property. 
The cases relied by Sandy Hills in its main brief, Cooper v. Boise 
Church of Christ. 96 Idaho 45, 524 P.2d 173 (1974), and Citv of 
Anchorage v. Nesbett, 530 P.2d 1324 (Alaska 1975), present a more 
sensible approach to the question of permission extended by a property 
owner once the property owner transfers its property. The Idaho Court 
held that permission may continue after the transfer of the licensor's 
property if the new owner does not object to the use and the licensee's 
use is not inconsistent with the rights of the new owner. 524 P.2d at 
176. The Alaska Court held that the transfer may revoke the 
permission, but that such revocation does not necessarily mean that the 
new use is adverse. The licensee mush establish that the new use is 
adverse. 530 P.2d at 1330. 
Significantly, when the Smiths transferred their property to Smith 
Investment Company in 1965, exhibit 3-P, the Deweys were still the 
owners of their property. Exhibits 7-P and 10-P. Reed and Barbara 
Smith were the president and vice-president, respectively, of the Smith 
Investment Company. Record at 798-99. Thus the people the Deweys 
dealt with remained Reed and Barbara Smith. Under such circumstances, 
for the Deweys1 use to have become adverse, the Deweys must have 
communicated their rejection of any further permissive use on their 
part. Otherwise, they would have in effect "sneak[ed] up" on the 
Smiths by using their property under permission and then, after a lapse 
of time, claimed they were using it as a matter of right. See Richins 
v. Struhs. 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314, 316 (1966). 
6. Homer Could not Tack to the Deweys* Use. 
Homerfs predecessor, Bonneville Drug, acquired the Homer building 
and the property to the east of it in 1976. Exhibit 7-P. Bonneville 
Drug acquired the east portions of Lots 3 and 4, Lichfield Gardens, in 
1982. Exhibit 13-P. In 1988, Bonneville Drug conveyed all of this 
property to Homer. Exhibit 14-P. Consequently, in order for Homer to 
establish a prescriptive use in himself, he must be able to tack his 
use to the use of his predecessors. Sandy Hills does not dispute that 
Utah allows tacking for the purpose of establishing the prescriptive 
period. Sandy Hills does not dispute that a tenant can originate 
adverse possession in his landlord fs favor i,f the lease expressly or 
impliedly includes the use of the claimed easement. Dereaibus v. 
Silberman Furniture Co.. 186 A.2d 553, 555 (Conn. 1936), after retrial, 
197 A. 760 (Conn. 1938).10 
Sandy Hills vigorously disputes that Bonneville Drug's lease 
included, expressly or impliedly, the right of Bonneville Drug to use 
10
 Homer'8 statement that Sandy Hills overlooked or disregarded the second (1938) 
Dereaibus opinion is petty. The second Dereaibus opinion an appeal of the retrial 
ordered in the first opinion and added nothing new to the law stated in the first 
opinion. Sandy Hills quoted from the first Dereaibus in its main brief that the right 
to use the claimed easement may be implied in the lease* Sandy Hills' brief at 31. 
the claimed easement. Reed Smith testified that so long as the Deweys 
owned their property, the permission the Smiths extended to the Deweys 
to use Sandy Hills1 property also extended to the Deweys1 lessees. 
Record at 1661. Homer's testimony regarding his lease established that 
use of the claimed easement was neither express nor implied, 
notwithstanding his acknowledgment on cross-examination that access was 
important to him. Record at 1276-77. In fact, Mr. Homer testified on 
cross-examination as follows: 
Q. . . . There's no question about the fact, is there, Mr. Homer, 
in your mind, but that Mr. Dewey gave you permission to have your 
customers come in and out of the parking area that you have 
labeled, if I can read it, C and B; is there? 
A. Mr. Dewey didn't give me permission. 
Q. Did he withhold permission? 
A. No. 
Q. So, in other words, I take it—you negotiated the lease on 
behalf of Bonneville Drug, didn't you? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And I take it one of the most important things to you as a 
pharmacist would be to be certain that customers of your drugstore 
were able to get in and out of that property; true? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So I take it, Mr. Homer, that it was important to you, in terms 
of the negotiation of the lease, that Mr. Dewey give you permission 
to have your customers come in and out? 
A. That was not stated in the lease, that I can remember. 
Q. We don't have what it states because you don't have a copy of 
it; do you? 
A. No, sir. 
A. You tell us, Mr. Homer, of any instance you can recall in the 
negotiations of the lease when your landlord said you can't have 
your customers come in or out of B or C. 
[Objection sustained based on hearsay, statement from 
deceased.] 
Q. Okay. Under that, your understanding of the lease agreements, 
Mr. Homer, are terms, if you would, whether or not your customers 
were permitted, by that landlord, to come into your business? 
A. They just case in. There was no permission granted. 
Q. Isnft it true, sir, that when you took occupancy of the Homer 
building and ran the drug store, you thought this was a public 
thoroughfare, that is, ingress and egress to and from your 
building? And you believed it was a public thoroughfare? 
A. I believed it was a parking lot for a certain number. 
Q. You thought it was a public thoroughfare? 
A. Thought it was a parking lot for a strip mall. 
Q. I have you turn to your deposition there, Mr. Homer, and have 
you look there at page 43. 
Do you have that page in front of you, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Do you see line eight? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That says: 
"Question: So the assumption when you bought the 
property through Bonneville Drug was—" 
,f
 Answer: Right—" 
Question continued: ••—That it was simply a public 
access to the shopping center from 13th South and from 21st 
East, is that right?" 
And what was your answer, sir? 
A. "Yes." 
Q. Do you still have that belief today, sir? 
A. In laymanfs terms, that's probably correct. 
Q. So, you believed at the time that you commenced business in the 
Homer building, as depicted on Exhibit 35-P, that there was public 
access from Points B and C on 21st East and public access from 
Points C and B coming off of 1300 South; didnft you? 
A. We had customers come in the place. 
Q. Was your understanding, just like you told us under oath in 
your deposition, that that constituted public access? Correct? 
A. The public came in and out of it. 
Record at 1276-1280. 
From the above testimony, it is apparent that Mr. Dewey and Mr. 
Homer had no conversations concerning access to the Homer building. 
Mr. Homer has made no claim that his initial written lease, which was 
orally renewed, record at 1278, contained any provision regarding 
access to the Homer building. Mr. Homer1s belief that there was public 
access through Points B and C belies any implied right of Homer to use 
those access points under the lease. Under such circumstances, it can 
hardly be said that the use of Sandy Hills' property in the front or 
the rear was expressed in the lease or implied under it. Accordingly, 
Homer cannot tack his (and Bonneville Drug's) use as owner of the 
property to Bonneville Drug's use as a tenant. 
C THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING HOMER TO 
REMOVE THE ENCROACHMENT OF THE UPPER 
STORY OF THE HOMER BUILDING FROM SANDY HILLS1 BUILDING 
As set forth in Sandy Hills' main brief, the elements of boundary 
by acquiescence were not met with respect to the encroachment of the 
upper story of the Homer building onto the Sandy Hills building. The 
trial court found "occupation of the respective buildings of the 
parties to a visible line marked bv the parties' abutting walls." 
Record at 724, 726 (Finding of Fact 2 relating to Counterclaim of Sandy 
Hills against Homer). If the abutting walls marked the visible in 
which the parties acquiesced, id., then the upper story encroachment 
over that line was required to be removed. Homer now argues, for the 
first time on appeal, that the visible line was the line marked by the 
abutting walls of the buildings "including the visible line marked bv 
the upper portion of the north wall." Homer brief at 44 (emphasis 
added). That, however was not the finding of the trial court and was 
not the position advanced by Homer below.11 
Homer now improperly argues, also for the first time on appeal, 
that assuming the trial court erred in finding boundary by 
acquiescence, under the balance of injury test, a court may exercise 
its discretion not to grant injunctive relief when there is no 
irreparable harm from the violation and the cost of removing the 
encroachment would be disproportionate and great compared to the 
benefit to be derived from its removal. Homer's articulating the 
balance of injury test reveals that it will not work for him. Homer 
presented no evidence of the cost of removing the encroachment. Simply 
stating that it will be expensive is not enough for the court to 
balance the injury. By contrast, Sandy Hills presented extensive 
evidence of the serious harm caused by the encroachment. 
Jack Shockey, a roofer hired by Sandy Hills to inspect and repair 
the roof of the Sandy Hills building, testified that the Sandy Hills 
roof did not leak, but that the north walls of the upper story of the 
Homer building were badly deteriorated and that water ran down those 
walls into the Sandy Hills building which was causing serious water 
damage to the ceiling. Record at 1540-1555. He also testified that in 
his opinion if the encroachment of the upper story of the Sandy Hills 
building did not exist, water would not run down the walls of the upper 
story of the Homer building into the Sandy Hills building. Record at 
1557-58. He acknowledged that if there were a common wall (one wall) 
between the two buildings, the water would run down either or both 
11
 In his trial brief, Homer contended that Sandy Hills' encroachment claim must 
fail: 
First, the abutting walls of the Homer building and the Sandy Hills building 
have been fixed and unchanged since the mid- or late-1950s. Their 
properties have clearly been occupied up to the visible line marked by their 
abutting walls and there has been mutual acquiescence in those abutting 
walls as the boundary line. 
sides, record at 1558, but Reed Smith testified that the walls were 
abutting walls, not one common wall. Record at 926. 
Accordingly, even under the balance of injury test, the 
encroachment should have been ordered removed. 
II. REPLY TO THE STEURS' BRIEF 
A. THE IMPROVEMENTS PLACED BY THE STEURS IN THE 
26-FOOT RIGHT-OF-WAY IMPERMISSIBLY 
REDUCED ITS WIDTH 
The right-of-way that Mrs. Callister conveyed to the Deweys and the 
Smiths over the northerly 26 feet of her property provided for two 
lanes of traffic for use by the "Grantees, their heirs and assigns, 
suppliers, customers and repairmen." Exhibit S-10. The 1953 Agreement 
signed by Mr. Dewey, Mr. Smith and Mrs. Callister, exhibit S-6, which 
was referenced in the Callister to Smith and Dewey right-of-way deed, 
provided that Mrs. Callister would give Smith and Dewey a right-of-way 
over approximately the northerly 26 and 1/2 feet of her property "to be 
used and usable by [Smith, Dewey and Callister] and the customers of 
the businesses of the parties to give access to the lands above-
described for business purposes and parking . . . ." Exhibit S-6. 
Mrs. Callister also agreed to provide a "sidewalk of at least three 
feet in width along one side [of the right-of-way] to be used "in 
conjunction" with the sidewalk Smith and Dewey would provide along the 
easterly portion of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Lichfield Gardens. Id. 
During the 1950s, Mrs. Callister installed a sidewalk along the 
north side of her building (the south side of the right-of-way) which 
was three feet wide, flush with the asphalt at the east end and raised 
perhaps two inches at the west end. Record at 1059. In 1986, the 
Steurs replaced the old sidewalk with a five-foot sidewalk which was 
raised five inches from the level of the asphalt. Steur brief at 13. 
In addition, the Steurs constructed a one-foot, raised curb on the 
north side of the a l l ey . Record at 299, 301-02. The f ive- foot 
sidewalk and one-foot curb reduced the width of the right-of-way for 
vehicle use. Record at 340-41. 
The Steurs argue, however, that prior to putting in the improve-
ments , the right-of-way was 26.8 feet wide and after the improvements 
were put in the right-of-way was 26.8 feet wide. Steur brief at 11. 
This argument i s inane. The one-foot curb i s not useable by pedest-
rians or vehic les , and the f ive-foot sidewalk i s only useable by 
pedestrians. Thus, the width of the right-of-way now travelable by 
vehic les i s 20.8 feet wide, a reduction of s ix f e e t . 1 2 
The Steurs argue that these improvements do not const i tute a breach 
of the deed of right-of-way or of the 1953 Agreement because the la t t er 
c a l l s for a sidewalk "at least three feet in width,11 and the f ive- foot 
sidewalk i s at l eas t three feet wide. According to the Steurs, the 
Agreement did not l imit the maximum width of the sidewalk. While that 
i s true, the Steurs would have to concede that the Agreement and deed 
of right-of-way would not allow a sidewalk which was a f u l l 26 feet 
wide, or half that , or even a third of the 26-foot width of the r ight-
of-way. 
The term "at l eas t three feet in width" i s ambiguous. Although Mr. 
Smith agreed that he was aware of no document which required the three-
foot sidewalk to be flush with the asphalt, record at 1062, he 
explained on cross-examination that the parties discussed improvements 
to be made in the right-of-way and agreed that they "would be ins ta l led 
in a manner that made very easy access for large uni t s , large trucks." 
12
 The Steurs argue that the reduction in width of the right-of-way, at most, i s 
three feet , since the original sidewalk was three feet wide. This ignores the 
uncontradicted evidence that the old sidewalk was flush with the asphalt at the east 
end and raised only one to two inches at the west end* Record at 1059. Mr. Smith 
t e s t i f i e d that use of the ful l 26 and 1/2 feet was available even with the old 
sidewalk. Record at 1060-61. 
Record at 1060. Mr. Smith testified that the parties agreed on the 
thickness of the asphalt and that 
[t]he purpose of a driveway was an alleyway for entrance by 
trucks, by patrons, by whatever. But we had the full use, 
utilization of 26-and-a-half feet. 
Record at 1061.13 
The Steurs claim that defendants' argument that the sidewalk could 
be no more than three feet wide would require the court to rewrite the 
Agreement. The defendants do not and have not ever argued that the 
sidewalk could be only three feet in width. The argument was that the 
sidewalk could not reduce the useable width of the right-of-way by 
vehicles. In other words, the installation of a raised sidewalk and 
13
 The Steurs assert that the Agreement was unambiguous regarding the requirement 
of a sidewalk at least three feet in width; therefore, Mr, Smith's testimony as to 
the parties' intent is irrelevant. The parol evidence rule prohibits extrinsic 
evidence offered to vary the terms of an unambiguous agreement. Bullouah v. Sims, 
16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965); however, Mr. Smith testified about an oral 
agreement of the parties concerning the dimensions of the sidewalk which transpired 
about three years after the Agreement was signed. In such a case, the parol evidence 
rule does not prohibit such evidence. See Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (extrinsic evidence allowed to determine parties' intent in modifying 
lease)• 
As set forth above, the sidewalk provision, "at least three feet in width," is 
ambiguous as to width but it is also ambiguous as to height. Therefore parol evidence 
was admissible to explain the parties' intent. Even if an agreement is unambiguous, 
however, 
when the parties place their own construction on it and so 
perform, the court may consider this as persuasive evidence of 
what their true intention was. 
Bullouah v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965). 
Steurs also claim that the trial court was free to disbelieve Mr. Smith's 
testimony. The strongest corroboration of Mr. Smith's testimony about the intent of 
the parties in constructing a three-foot sidewalk flush with the asphalt is the old 
sidewalk itself, which was three feet wide and essentially flush with the surface of 
the right-of-way. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
The fact that evidence is "uncontradicted" may be persuasive, or in some 
instances even conclusive. • • • One of the most salutary features of our 
system of government is that throughout its entire structure there are 
checks and balances . . . . This is the basis for the right of review on 
appeal whereby a court or iurv may be prevented from obdurately refusing to 
accept credible uncontradicted evidence without any rational basis for doing 
so. 
Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 P.2d 132 (1966). 
curb violated the agreement because it reduced the vehicle-useable 
width of the right-of-way by six feet.14 
Arguing that the trial court was required to construe the 1953 
Agreement as a whole and harmonize its provisions, the Steurs justify 
the five-foot wide, five-inch high sidewalk by pointing to the sidewalk 
of the same dimensions lying along the east edge of the 50-foot right-
of-way on the Homer and Sandy Hills property. "The defendants never 
claimed that they had violated the Agreement by constructing their 
sidewalk." Steur brief at 13. Of course defendants did not claim they 
violated the Agreement and neither did the Steurs. The fifty-foot 
right-of-way on the Homer and Sandy Hills property has a function much 
different from the 26-foot right-of-way on the Steur property. The 
Agreement provides in paragraph 4: 
First Parties [Smith and Dewey] agree to provide parking 
spaces on approximately two-thirds of said Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, 
as diminished by necessary boundaries, shrubs, lawns, barriers 
and sidewalks as prescribed by the Planning and Zoning 
Commission of Salt Lake City and as shall be agreed between the 
parties and to make parking spaces for eighteen automobiles on 
said lands available for the customers of Second Party [Mrs. 
Callister], the parking spaces to be arranged so as to give 
effective ingress and egress to and from the parking lot at 
13th South as well as 21st East with as much expedition as can 
reasonably be arranged consistent with the needs of all the 
parties to parking a large number of automobiles. 
Exhibit S-6 (emphasis added). The deed of right-of-way from the Deweys 
and Smiths to Mrs. Callister provides in pertinent part that the 
grantors granted to Mrs. Callister a right-of-way of 
[a] portion not less than 50 feet in width from East 
to West along the Easterly portion of [Lots 1, 2, 3 
and 4 ], except where shrubs, curbs and grades are 
required by the Salt Lake City Planning and Zoning 
Commission, and except where buildings of the 
Grantors and uses accessory thereto occupy the 
extreme Easterly portion of said tract, which uses 
u
 The Steurs discuss at length the sidewalk but ignore the one-foot curb on the 
north side of the right-of-way. There is no provision in the Agreement or deed of 
right-of-way calling for such a curb and it clearly reduces the width of the right-of-
way for all purposes—vehicular and pedestrian* 
shall not reduce the width of the right of way to 
less than 50 feet. 
Together with free ingress and egress for the Grantee, her 
heirs and assigns, in common with the Grantors, their heirs and 
assigns, customers and other persons permitted by Grantors to 
use said area with the right in Grantee, her heirs and assigns 
to use portions of said area sufficient to park eighteen (18) 
automobiles of customers of Grantee, her heirs and assigns 
• • • • 
Exhibit S-10 (emphasis added). Thus, the 50-foot right-of-way was to 
be used not only for ingress and egress, but also for parking. The 
Agreement recognized that the parking area would be diminished by 
sidewalks and other uses. 
The Steurs1 explain that the improvements they placed in the right-
of-way did not obstruct traffic, but "may have slightly favored 
pedestrian traffic at the expense of vehicular traffic . . . ." Steur 
brief at 15. The Agreement does not provide that pedestrian traffic 
can be favored over vehicular traffic, and the right-of-way deed, 
exhibit S-ll, does not mention pedestrian traffic at all. The fact 
that the Agreement provides for a right-of-way of a specified width 
without designating a width for pedestrians and a width for vehicles 
would indicate that neither use could be favored over the other. With 
the previous sidewalk being constructed flush with the right-of-way 
surface, neither use was favored. Pedestrians could walk upon the 
entire width, and vehicles, if necessary, could drive upon the 
sidewalk. The Steurs upset this balance by reducing the width of the 
right-of-way for vehicles, and this they were not entitled to do. 
Thus, Squaw Peak Community Covenant Church of Phoenix v. Anozira 
Development, Inc.. 719 P.2d 295 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), does apply. 
When the terms of the easement are clear, the easement owner is 
entitled to the full enjoyment of the easement as spelled out in the 
conveyance, regardless of whether the owner uses the entire easement. 
Id* at 299-300• In addition, Consolidated Amusement Co. v. Waikiki 
Business Plaza, Inc., 719 P.2d 1119 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986), does not 
favor the Steurs. The sidewalk placed in the easement for pedestrian 
purposes was agreed to by the parties subsequent to the granting of the 
easement. The parties1 agreement then called for a five-foot 
pedestrian passageway and a five-foot roadway, the latter of which 
would become a pedestrian easement if vehicular use ceased. The later 
construction of permanent improvements in the pedestrian passageway by 
the defendant in Consolidated Amusement violated the easement because 
it reduced its width. Id. at 1122, 1123. The Steurs1 sidewalk and 
curb were not placed pursuant to agreement, but over the vigorous 
dissent of Sandy Hills. 
B. THE STEURS1 IMPROVEMENTS MADE THE RIGHT-OF-WAY 
LESS INVITING TO SUPPLIERS 
The properties owned by the parties to this action are commercial. 
The Steurs attempt to trivialize the need for reasonable access to 
Sandy Hills1 property by commercial suppliers by noting that 
"defendants1 whole argument is based on one word in the Deed of Right 
of Way." Steur brief at 19. The word is "suppliers:" 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said right of way to the said Grantees, 
their heirs and assigns, suppliers, customers and repairmen • 
. . . 
Exhibit S-ll. Access by suppliers would not have been more important 
had it been mentioned twice. 
The "red herring"—the ability of a medium-sized delivery truck 
(50-foot tractor/trailer combination) to access the Sandy Hills 
property through the 26-foot right-of-way—was created by the Steurs, 
not by Sandy Hills. As a consequence of the Steurs1 improvements in 
the right-of-way, the right-of-way has lost utility for large delivery 
trucks. Jack De Mass1 uncontradicted testimony and evidence was that 
as a result of the raised, five-foot sidewalk, a 50-foot 
tractor/trailer could not make a right-hand turn off 2100 East into the 
right-of-way without either crossing the double yellow line in 2100 
East or driving up over the sidewalk which would cause the sidewalk to 
be "busted out of that, out of there, in short order" if the sidewalk 
were not reinforced. Record at 1497-98. 
The significance of this evidence is that it demonstrates the 
damage to Sandy Hills caused by the Steurs1 improvements. It is 
immaterial that at the time of trial, the Sandy Hills building was 
unleased and therefore, there was no need for large trucks to access 
the building. It is immaterial that during the 10 years preceding 
trial, the Sandy Hills building was occupied by a fabric store which 
had no need for access to the building by large trucks. It is 
material, however, that the Steurs reduced the width of the easement in 
contravention of the 1953 Agreement and the deed of right-of-way, 
regardless of whether the reduction caused damage. It is material that 
the reduction of the right-of-way adversely impacted the present 
ability of large vehicles to access the property. 
In Aladdin Petroleum Corp v. Gold Crown Properties, Inc.. 221 Kan. 
579, 561 P.2d 818 (1977), the Court held: 
[W]here the width, length and location of an easement for 
ingress and egress have been expressly set forth in the 
instrument the easement is specific and definite. The 
expressed terms of the grant or reservation are controlling in 
such case and considerations of what may be necessary or 
reasonable to a present use of the dominant estate are not 
controlling. 
561 P.2d at 822 (citing 3 Tiffany, Real Property § 805 (3d ed. 1939); 
28 C.J.S. Easements § 75 (emphasis added). 
In Aladdin, the Court also held that carports erected in the right-
of-way (which did not prevent access, but merely reduced the width of 
the right-of-way) violated the easement. "Construction of carports or 
other permanent obstructions over a portion of an easement for passage 
of a definite width wrongfully impairs and interferes with the 
privilege of passage which the owner of the definite easement holds." 
Id. at 825 (emphasis added). 
This case involves an easement of definite dimensions; therefore, 
the size of suppliers1 vehicles in 1954, when the easement was created, 
does not control.15 Sandy Hills is entitled to the use of the full 
width of the easement and the Steurs1 reduction of that width is 
impacting the ability of present-day suppliers to access the right-of-
way. It is immaterial that there may not be a present need for such 
suppliers to access the right-of-way—Sandy Hills is not confined to 
leasing its property only to tenants who do not require access by large 
delivery vehicles. 
The Steurs argue that the barrier erected by Sandy Hills along the 
south boundary of Lot 2 prevents anyone from accessing one of the Sandy 
Hills1 building1s two back doors; therefore, Sandy Hills does not need 
the 26-foot right of way for its suppliers. Sandy Hills, however, 
constructed the barrier in response to the Steurs1 wrongful 
construction of improvements in the 26-foot right-of-way. In addition, 
whether Sandy Hills needs access for suppliers through the right-of-way 
is immaterial. The right-of-way is not an easement by implication or 
way of necessity. Sandy Hills owns the right to access through the 
right-of-way for its suppliers and that right was impeded by Steurs1 
actions. 
The Steurs argue that it is not physically impossible for a 50-foot 
tractor/trailer to turn right from 2100 East into the right-of-way. 
15
 Likewise, the parties' contemplation at the time of the Agreement of the size 
of delivery vehicles does not control when the easement is of a definite width. Sandy 
Hills' commercial lessees are not limited to trading with suppliers who use 1950s 
vintage delivery vehicles. 
That is absolutely true. It is not physically impossible. It is, 
however, physically much more difficult. The access with the 
improvements in the right-of-way has been reduced and is consequently 
less inviting. 
C THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PARTIES DID 
NOT CONTEMPLATE SEMI TRACTOR-TRAILERS USING THE 
RIGHT-OF-WAY IN LIGHT OF THE PLAIN LANGUAGE 
OF THE DEED AND AGREEMENT 
The trial court found: 
10. The Agreement did not contemplate semi-
tractor/trailers having access to the rear of the 
Sandy Hills, Inc. buildings through the right-of-way 
inasmuch as the parking arrangement precluded semi-
tractor/trailers from having access to the rear of 
the Sandy Hills, Inc. buildings. 
Record at 692, 695 (Finding of Fact 10). This finding is erroneous 
because the deed of right-of-way expressly allowed access by the 
grantees1 (Deweys1 and Smiths1) suppliers to the rear of their 
buildings. Exhibit S-ll. In addition, and as set forth in 
defendants1 main brief, the trial courtfs finding that a 50-foot 
tractor/trailer could not access the rear with the current parking 
arrangement evinces a misunderstanding of Jack De Mass1 testimony. On 
cross-examination he testified: 
Q. Okay. And your testimony is that he could not make the right-
hand turn up here into the 50-foot right-of-way unless there were 
no cars parked up there, right? 
A. With the sidewalk in place, that is correct. 
Q. Okay. You're talking about the same sidewalk over here to the 
left-hand side. 
A. Yes. 
Record at 1522 (emphasis added). 
The Steurs argue that De Mass did not say that the truck could make 
the turn with the old sidewalk in place. The necessary implication of 
Mr. De Mass1 testimony, however, is that with the use of the full width 
of the easement—which was possible with the old sidewalk—the truck 
driver could maneuver the right-hand turn from the 26-foot right-of-way 
into the 50-foot right-of-way. 
Nevertheless, the Steurs argue that the deed of right-of-way from 
the Smiths and Deweys to Callister required a parking plan designating 
parking areas and travel ways. According to the Steurs, since the 
parking plan defendants1 established would not allow a fifty-foot 
tractor trailer to turn into the 50-foot right of way if all the 
parking spaces were filled, the parties did not contemplate that fifty-
foot rigs would use the 26-foot right-of-way. 
First, Reed Smith testified that a parking plan was never 
established. Record at 267-68. Second, defendants (the Smiths and 
Sandy Hills) would not have established a parking plan on the Homer 
property, which is where the difficulty lies. Reed Smith testified 
that the parties separately maintained the parking areas on the east 
portions of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4. Third, De Mass1 testimony was not that 
the truck could not enter the 50-foot right-of-way with all the parking 
places filled. He said that the truck could not negotiate the turn 
"unless there were no cars up there" (on the west side of the parking) 
with the sidewalk in place. Record at 1522, 1524-25. Finally, Mr. De 
Mass stated that if compact cars parked in all of the west side spaces 
except the first two, the truck could negotiate the turn—with the 
sidewalk in place. Record at 1524-25, 1522. It would not be difficult 
for Homer to designate those west side parking stalls for compact cars 
only so that the parking use of the 50-foot right-of-way did not 
conflict with the ingress/egress use of the 26-foot right-of-way for 
suppliers.16 Under the trial courtfs finding, the present-day 
arrangement of the parking stalls dictates what the parties 
contemplated in 1953 and 1954. In any event, what the parties 
contemplated when they entered into the Agreement is that it would be 
used by suppliers. The deed of right-of-way is perpetual: 
That the Grantor . . . does hereby grant to the Grantees, their 
heirs and assigns forever, a right of way . . . . 
. . . 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said right of way to the said 
Grantees, their heirs and assignees, suppliers, customers and 
repairmen, and for their use forever in common with the Grantor 
• • • • 
Exhibit S-ll. 
Thus, the p a r t i e s contemplated t h a t the right-of-way would be used 
by supp l i e r s in the fu ture . Supplies are cur ren t ly de l ivered in large 
t r u c k s . As the court s t a ted in Camp Meeker Water System v. Public 
U t i l i t i e s Comm'n. 799 P.2d 758 (Cal. 1990), fl[A]n express easement i s 
designed t o accommodate future needs." Id. a t 771. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
f inding i s c l e a r l y in e r ro r . 
In conclusion, the improvements placed by the Steurs in r igh t -o f -
way impermissibly reduced i t s width. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons s e t for th herein and in Appellants1 main br ief , 
Appellants r e spec t fu l ly request : 
1. That t h i s Court reverse the t r i a l c o u r t ' s awarding t o Homer a 
p r e s c r i p t i v e easement across the front and rea r of the Sandy H i l l s 
property and order the t r i a l court to enter a judgment dismissing 
Homer's claim for a p re sc r ip t ive easement with pre jud ice ; 
16
 I t i s arguably impermissible under the terms of the 1953 Agreement and the 
deeds of r ight-of-way for the parking arrangement on the 50-foot r ight-of-way t o 
c o n f l i c t with the use of the 26-foot right-of-way• 
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, and direct the court to 
enter an order requiring Homer to remove the encroachment; and 
3. Reverse the trial court's determination that the Steurs were 
entitled to construct the "improvements" in the 26-foot right-of-way, 
and direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of defendants and 
against the Steurs on the Steurs1 claim. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of November, 1992. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSK 
W. SESSIONS ^ - ^ 
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Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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Judge John A. Rokich 
ROBERT STEUR and DEBRA u. 
STEUR, and ROBERT STEUR, 
INC., Li U1.ah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
REED M. SMITH, BARBARA D. 
SMITH and SANDY HILLS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant.!:., 
Case No. 89-0902925 
rursiiaiil In fhp p rov i s ions nf Ru! 
C i v i l Procedure, Defendant Sandy Hi. s> : . t f following 
Answers to Plaintiff Frederick R. Homer's First Set of 
Interrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. L : Identify the person answering these 
Interrogatories and describe that persons' legal relationship to 
the Defendant Sandy Hills, Inc. 
ANSWER: Reed M. Smith, 1305 Yuma Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah; Secretary. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2.: Identify each person who participated 
in the preparation of any answer or response to these 
Interrogatories, and specify which answer or response each person 
helped prepare. 
ANSWER: Reed M. Smith; all Interrogatories. Cynthia K. 
Cassell, Campbell Maack & Sessions, 170 South Main Street, #400, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; all Interrogatories. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3.: Identify each person the Defendant 
Sandy Hills, Inc. expects to call as a witness at the trial of 
this matter, and state: 
(a) the subject matter on which he or she is expected 
to testify; and 
(b) the substance of the facts and opinions about which 
he or she is expected to testify. 
ANSWER: Reed M. Smith will testify about the history of the 
ownership and development of the area on 21st East which is the 
2 
subpe^ mat-tf* * ^ ? * opertv owned *h 
Hi I 
1
 „ -v i M property owned by Plaintiffs a* - - n*:- >WT * - whc se 
proper ituate 
the bandy H n .*. erein 
"Subject Arer MT . Smith r<-?t concerning his 
property in the Subject Area, arid trie leasing and sale of Dewey's 
property others iI h will testify concerning Vera 
^toperty i n l.li1 Hub ji 
the --.-- * :allisterfs property 1 u others. 
Mr. Smith will testify »': 
1. Thai hi:111,, I r.-hon-He? ^ n d p u rposes, was the 
• original commercial deve]
 j>-__ __ property in the Subject 
Area ; 
2 . That he and Barbara Smith f i r s t purchased p r o p e r t y 
i n the Subjec t Area in or about 1947, and s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r 
1"""|:. '-i riii 1, i n I ' l i i i ' i ,! ' j i o c o r y s i rin t'111 l i n t l . l i i i „ y n, I Ii ,j,l p i o p e r t y ; 
3 . That Thomas Dewey d e s i r e d t o purchased pax* 
p r o p e r t y purchased by MT .inrl Mr» Smith - uiiau Mx. u<-^  
i i\h In mi i > h u i l d i n g on t h e p r o p e r t y ; 
Smi th ' s e v e n t u a l l y so ld t o him, p r i o r t o t h e t ime t h e Smiths 
a c t u a l l y so ld t h e p roper ty in liiiii , 
4. That the Dewey drugstore and the Smith grocery 
store had been operating for several years before the west 
side of 21st East Street was improved with curb, gutter and 
sidewalk, and that prior to the installation of these 
improvements, patrons of the businesses drove their cars 
directly off the street onto the parking areas of the stores, 
unrestricted by curbs or other barriers separating the street 
and the parking areas; 
5. That in connection with 21st East Street's 
improvement with curb, gutter and sidewalk, Mr. Smith and Mr. 
Dewey vehemently objected to Salt Lake City's decisions 
respecting placement of curb cuts along 21st East Street, to 
no avail; 
6. That after 21st East Street was improved with curb, 
gutter and sidewalk, Mr. Smith permitted Mr. Dewey and his 
patrons to traverse Mr. Smith's property located adjacent to 
the Dewey property; 
7. That in 1963, or thereabouts, Mr. Dewey began 
leasing the drugstore building to Plaintiff Homer, and that 
in or about 1976, Plaintiff Homer purchased the drugstore 
building including the barbershop, pizza parlor and 
apartments, from Lorraine Dewey, Mr. Dewey's widow; 
4 
8. Thai neither M.i Smith, nor his successor^ 
(||d\M l ( I P ! lii i SS l (H I I I I 
l e s s e e s nil uLtieis n. HI d uu i ni| I y, through on under him, 
traverse the p roper ly owned by Mr, Smith or h i s s u c c e s s o r ^ ) 
mi III III III II i mi in II mi in in in III 111 mi I i i mi I I I n M H 1 1 1 1 v 111 mi III II " i I HI i II i III i n y i ; 
9 • That Plaintif f Homn i I I essees, agents, 
customer-- invitees and others have wrongfully trespassed on 
Sanay ' property by traversing and par k ingi" on the sam^-
aintilf Homer's apartmer lessees havt 
w r r s prill o n I 11 I In • in u m I I 
damage to the root. 
e Sandy Hills roof leaks continually during 
in " j i p i t e i * j p( '« ! I ("ii i e p d i mi i I I IN11" i" Il iiillii '" 
a *^r* r^. information and belief, in the encroachment ol 
the nortii he apartments over the Homer building. 
1 2 . 1 Ii rJiiil, III1 JI d J j i t 11 ll, Ik, in(,•„""in bought the rear portions ot 
Lots 3 and 4 ot I Ii Litchfield Gardens from Evans and 
Jorgason several ],, rears subsequi 
t " Jl". " • Dewey; 
I - - . °* *> )ewey, 
ol-way and parkii ig areas ; 
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14. That Mr. Smith, Mr. Dewey and Mrs. Callister 
entered into an agreement in November, 1953, whereby in 
exchange for Mrs. Callister's granting to Mr. Dewey and to 
Mr. Smith the right to use her alleyway running east and west 
from 21st East to the rear of Mr. Smith's and Mr. Dewey's 
properties, Mr. Smith and Mr. Dewey granted Mrs. Callister 
the right to use 9 parking spaces on each of Mr. Smith's and 
Mr. Dewey's rear parking areas and the right to cross Mr. 
Smith's rear parking area from 1300 South to Mr. Dewey's rear 
parking area and to cross Mr. Dewey's rear parking area to 
her alleyway. 
15. That after purchasing Mrs. Callister's property, 
the Steur Plaintiffs, in breach of the November, 1953, 
agreement and the subsequently recorded rights-of-way, 
narrowed the alleyway from approximately 26 feet to 
approximately 21 feet, despite Smith's and Sandy Hills' oral 
and written objections thereto; 
16. That the Steur Plaintiffs, in violation of the 
November, 1953, agreement and the subsequently recorded 
rights-of-way, have used many more than 18 total parking 
spaces in the rear parking areas owned by Plaintiff Homer and 
Defendant Sandy Hills; and that the Steur Plaintiffs have 
further authorized and directed their patrons to park on the 
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front park ing area of the? Sandy Hi l l s* p a r c e l d e s p i t e demand 
in mi i i in in > 11 1 1 mi in in 1 1 in in 1 1 1 . . ) mi i in 11 i 
I J1 , That t hi-; S teurs have I n c i t e d o the • • , including 
Steur 's patrons iiinml neighbor ing businofin iiwncri 
a g a i n s t RHCIII iind Barbara SmiLli p e r s o n a l l y tor Sandy H i l l s ' 
e f f o r t s to p o l i c e i t s park ing art 
Mi Suit i I III i - n i in in I i I in mil in ||i i IIIII I I 
H i l l s h a s s u £ f e r e d « ;) i P 1 a i n 1 i 1 f s i f t r r o n g f u II 
actions. 
egoxin, exhaustive, 
but summary >• ubstance Smith's 
expected testimony. Further, Mr". Smith has been depose Il IIIII in ill: Ji = 
case, which testimony MI whole or in part will be used at trial. 
Barbara Smith, 1305 Yuma, Sri It Lake City, Utah, may be called 
as a wi in in " l i s t " " , II I s h i p i ,«• " a II II v .1 i i f i * i L n e . s is I I I I I I II 11111 
case, the subject matter and substance of her testimony L*-> 
expected to be substantially identical to Mr Smith's testimony. 
Defendants »"eFen ^  I In i i< " in ivill i M 11 i.i I I .i I witnesses whoiit? 
identi i i.e:i m <• J ncapable ascert'a mmeni jl this time, 
Defendants also reserve t..w -^ .v,**w ^o supplement Lhexr answer Lo 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 4.; Identify each person the Defendant 
Sandy Hills expects to call as an expert witness at the trial of 
this matter and state: 
(a) the subject matter on which he or she is expected 
to testify; and 
(b) That the substance of the facts and opinions about 
which he is she is expected to testify. 
ANSWER: Jack L. DeMass (hereinafter "Mr. DeMassM), Civil 
Engineer and Registered Land Surveyor, 118 Vine Street, Murray, 
Utah, will testify concerning his survey of property and 
buildings contained in the Subject Area. Mr DeMass will testify 
that the north wall of the apartment building located above the 
Homer building encroaches over onto the Sandy Hills building, and 
that the construction of a sidewalk in the alleyway running east 
and west from 21st East Street reduced the width of the alleyway 
from approximately 26 feet to approximately 21 feet. 
David T. Beaufort of Wayne T. VanWagoner & Assoc, will 
testify concerning his survey of the alleyway and will testify 
that as a result of the construction of a sidewalk in the 
alleyway, a typical 18-wheel tractor-trailer rig is not able to 
get to the rear of the Sandy Hills building via the alleyway. 
Jack Shockey, Shockey Roofing, will testify concerning his 
re-roofing the Sandy Hills building, and that in his opinion, the 
2100}$.DS2 8 
n o r t h w a l l of t h e a p a r t m e n t s above t h e Homer b u i l d i n g has caused 
| 11 I 111,1 II II ll"1 |ll I II II ' I • II .•I l l '"'{I"-' "Will 111 ' II I"! I I I III III I" 
the Sandy Miljb baildxiiy despite re-roofing and maintenance on 
the Sandy HI Lis roof, 
J IMI i i III III III i l l l l l l l III I l| I I I i i [ l | III d 1 h P I IM i ' 11 11 llHjlll " I f I I i " f i r ' i ! I 
property values due tu problems with the property and limitation 
o.ii ingress and egress. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 5.; Identify al 1 documents which the 
Defendant Sandy Hills, Inc. intends to introduce as exhibits at 
ANSWER: Pursuant to Rule 33(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure )efendant Sandy Hills 
i ntern icia 
i n s p e c t i o i s p o n s e e n t n t ' s T h i r d Request i 
P r o d u c t i o n nocumen+- 'hi ^h *iC xxou r e c j u e s t e d i n t u e 
'• '.'ii'etj'J1!, it,' e r r o g a i c o m p i l e d . 
DATED t h i s d a y >n A p r i l , jq<»n 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
CYNTllIA K. CASSELL 
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SANDY Ji lLLS, INC. 
Qyi REED'M. SftlTH 
/ I t s : Secretary 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this y day of April, 1990, personally appeared before 
Reed M. Smith, who being by me first duly sworn, did say that he 
is the Secretary of Sandy Hills, Inc., a Utah corporation, and 
that he has read the foregoing and knows the contents thereof and 
the same are true to the best of his knowledge, except as to 
those matters therein stated to be alleged upon information and 
belief, and to those matters he believes them to be true; that 
the foregoing was signed on behalf of said corporation and 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same. 
/ f & Y p^vN. NOTARY PUBLIC\ y J ^r " -, 
f&S*~^<l;~ \ Residing ±X.x ^ U £ U * 9 (U^ 
My Commission Expires: 
*:•> 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I 111,'HI IIV I ' K R T I I'V II I I I Il Il In » c' i l l l i l i " , Il ( i l l i I , II "r "I I"!' 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF HOMER'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES was served on Plaintiff hy having hand-delivered 
il, I nit"" and correct v here* 11 h I.hi.' 
Harold C. Verhaaren, Esq 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Michae 1 1 J. Homer, Esq. 
Paul M. Simmons, Esq. 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Clark Learning Office Center, 7th Floor 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake Ci ty, Utah 84 III CI 111 Ill 1 8 0 
4J^CC6^^C •„ 
